

**THE POLITICS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN MALAWI'S FORESTRY  
SECTOR**

**MASTERS OF ARTS (POLITICAL SCIENCE) THESIS**

**RODWELL GEORGE NEHEMIAH KATUNDU**

**UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI ,**

**NOVEMBER, 2021**



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**BY**

**RODWELL GEORGE NEHEMIAH KATUNDU**

BA (Political Science) -University of Malawi

Submitted to the Faculty of Social Science, University of Malawi, in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (Political Science)

**UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI,**

**NOVEMBER, 2021**

## **DECLARATION**

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my work. Where the work of other people has been used, acknowledgements have been duly made. I also declare that it has not been submitted for any degree in any other university. All errors herein are my own.

**RODWELL GEORGE NEHEMIAH KATUNDU**

**Full Legal Name**

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**Signature**

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**Date**

## **CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL**

We certify that this thesis is the student's work and acknowledgements have been made where the work of other people has been used. We further certify that it has not been submitted to any other university for any degree and is therefore submitted with our approval.

**Signature:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

Michael Chasukwa, PhD (Associate Professor)

**Main Supervisor**

**Signature:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

Kondwani Chikadza, (Lecturer)

**Second Supervisor**

## **DEDICATION**

To Dr M.G.C. Katundu and Dr K.G.H. Katundu, we have done it.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Forest degradation has been and remains a challenge in Malawi despite having formal forest institutions to remedy the situation. This study aimed at solving a puzzle presented in literature of not employing a political approach in analysing how the politics of policy implementation in the forestry sector. To solve this puzzle this study adopted a political economy approach by analysing the interest of the relevant stakeholders and effectiveness of forest institutions. This study used qualitative methods to collect data to data from Dedza and Zomba forest plantations. It using semi-structured and key informant interviews. This study found that Institutions do affect policy outcomes in the implementation of forest policy in Malawi. The study further found that institutions make up the working rules that determine and influence the actions that are taken by stakeholders in their access and withdrawal of forest resources. The argument is that the interest, incentives and effectiveness of both formal and informal forest institutions do affect the success of forest policy implementation. In addition to this, this study has discovered that there is an interaction between formal and informal institutions in the management of forest resources. This kind of interaction does positively and negatively affect policy outcomes.



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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

|      |                                    |
|------|------------------------------------|
| CBFM | Community Based Forest Management  |
| FD   | Forest Department                  |
| TA   | Traditional Authority              |
| VFA  | Village Forest Area                |
| VNRC | Village Natural Resource Committee |

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1. Introduction**

The Malawi forest policy was first adopted in 1996. According to the 2016 Malawi forest policy, it is aimed at conserving, establishing, protecting and managing trees and forests for the sustainable development of Malawi. Despite having a forest policy with clear goals of conserving, establishing, protecting and managing trees and forests for the sustainable development of Malawi, forest degradation remains a challenge (Hudak & Wessman, 2000). This suggests that the forest policy in Malawi falls short in achieving its goals. Halsworth et al (2011), in their discussion on why policies fail argued that there is the primacy of politics in policy success or failure. This means that policy success or failure can take place at any stage in the policy cycle (Howlet et al, 2009).

This study aimed at analysing how the politics of policy implementation affects the outcomes of forest policy in the forest sector. To achieve this, this study adopted Leftwich's description of politics which occurs in the second level, which he referred to as the games within the rules (Leftwich, 2008). The aim of doing this was to solve the puzzle on how politics affects the forest policy outcome in the implementation stage.

To solve this puzzle this study firstly, focussed on analysing the interest of stakeholders in the forest institutions. The argument here is that institutions do

provide incentives and disincentives on the acceptable behaviour of these stakeholders (Dulani, 2011). Secondly, it focussed on the effects of these interest on forest resources. Thirdly this study analysed the effectiveness of formal institutions in regulating the behaviour of the stakeholders. Here the argument was that the effectiveness of the forest laws and rules, determines whether these institutions are going to achieve their intended goals or not (North, 1991). Lastly, this study analyses the effects of the effectiveness of these institutions on forest resources. This part looks at how the effectiveness of the institutions affects the conservation of forest resources.

The main argument that this study presents is that formal and informal institutions do affect the successful implementation of forest policy and act. These institutions do provide an environment in which incentives and disincentives are presented, which determines the natyre of the interaction among these stakeholders in the management of forest resources. As a result this determines the success of the forest policy and act.

This study is divided into five chapters. The first one is the introduction, which gives the background to the study, the problem that is there in the management of forest resources in Malawi, and it justifies why the study is worth conducting. The second part of the introduction outlines the main objective and the specific objectives for this study. The second chapter of this paper is the literature review that shows the gap that is there in the literature with regard to the politics of policy implementation in Malawi, which this study tries to fill. In addition to this, the literature review presents the theory that has been used to make sense of the findings of this study. The third chapter is the methodology adopted by this study, the study area and the study participants, data collection tools and the method used for analyzing the data that was collected. The fourth chapter presents the study findings and discussion that this study



found. The last chapter is the conclusions which also offers recommendations concerning the findings and the discussions presented in this study.

## **1.2 Background to the study**

The negative effects of climate change and environmental degradation has led to the emergence of arguments for the significance of conserving the natural environment and forests in particular (Keohane, 2015). Environmental degradation has become a significant issue in the latter part of the 20th century among global world actors (O'Brien, and William, 2016). This is because of its negative effects on climate change. The argument here is that human activities, which are not restrained by institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004) contribute to environmental degradation. It is recognised that stakeholders of the natural environment do play a role in conserving and degrading the environment.

As a result scholars like Keohane (2015) proposed for the adoption of good institutions like property rights as a remedy to these problems. The argument here is that common pool resources are well managed either by the state or by private ownership (Agrawal, 2003). Keohane (2015), overlooked the fact that good institutions alone are not enough as the success and the failure of these institutions, are determined on their formulation and implementation of these institutions (Hallsworth et al, 2011).

The debate about having property rights were fuelled as result of reactions by scholars to the article by an ecologist Garret Hardin which was published in December, 1968. In this article Hardin narrates the parable of pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. As a

rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain, in which the end result is exploitation and degradation of the pasture land. He concludes by saying

*There in is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a common brings ruin to all (Hardin, 1968, p.1244).*

This article advocated for state, private and collective ownership and management of natural resources to avoid degradation and the tragedy that comes with free rights of access of these resources by all individuals. As a result, debates have sparked on cause of forest degradation, with the aim of finding ways of dealing with environmental degradation. Scholars like O'Brien and Williams (2016), argued that in the developing world, poverty has led to economic practices that contribute to, among other things, deforestation and pollution (OBrien and Williams, 2016). Another argument was that advanced industrial countries like Japan and the United States of America and China importing timber from tropical rainforests in Southeast Asia and South America. Le Bellion (2002) on the other hand noted that the problem of forest degradation is caused by illegal forest practices, lack of incentives, political interference, politics of expertise, and informal institutions.

In Malawi the conservation of the natural environment is not a novel issue. Mulwafu (2010), noted that the issue of conserving the environment started in the 1890s when Malawi, then Nyasaland was declared the British protectorate. It was noted that the environmental conservation initiatives by the colonial government failed due to

ineffective enforcement of the conservation laws, and lack of cooperation in abiding by these laws by the some of the stakeholders (Mulwafu, 2010). This highlights how politics affects the successful implementation of conservation laws. In the early years 21<sup>st</sup> century, the causes of forest degradation in Malawi has been attributed to bad agricultural practices, corruption, illegal charcoal production and harvesting of forests. Inadequate enabling policy, legal, institutional framework to support sustainable charcoal production (Mutimba and Kamoto, 2017), and political intervention.

All these studies do recognise that various stakeholders do play a part in either conserving and degradaing the environment, of which forests are part of it. According to Dewulf (2007), forest degradation is a wicked problem. As such it requires the collaboration of all stakeholders of the forests to deal with the problem. This means that there is a need to understand the interest of these stakeholders and how they contribute to the conservation of forests in both institutions and the implementation and enforcements of these institutions in both the rules of the game and the games among stakeholders in the implementation of these games (Leftwich, 2007). As such it was imperative for this study to analye the effectiveness and the interest of these stakeholders and how these determine their interaction in the management of these resources, and how this affects the success or failure of institutions like policies to conserve forests.

## **1.2. Problem statement**

The main forest institutions tools that are used in Malawi are the Forest Act and the forest Policy. Despite having a good forest policy and Forest Act, the forest sector in Malawi is facing the challenge of forest degradation (Hudak & Wessman, 2000). As

argued by Dewulf (2007), the successful implementation of the forest institutions depends on the collaboration of all stakeholders in managing sustainably forests in Malawi. Since the introduction of conservation laws in Malawi, their successes have always depended on the interest of the stakeholders involved and the effectiveness of the institutions in achieving the desired results (Mulwafu, 2010).

The available literature with respect to the causes of environmental degradation in Malawi suffers from the problem of critical analysis of the the interests of the forest stakeholders and effectiveness of the forest institutions. Literature does suggests the factors that contribute to forest degradation, but does not fully explain the conditions that sustains these factors, and this make it to be deficient. Firstly, it has been noted that informal institutions like corruption was encouraging illegal deforestation and illegal charcoal business (Kambewa et al 2007: and Yaron et al 2011). Kambewa et al (2007), noted that in Malawi the forest officers and police at roadblocks were at the forefront taking bribes from illegal charcoal transporters and producers. These studies leave several questions unanswered. These questions are: Firstly, why do these informal institutions exist alongside formal institutions, where the forest and police officers do abide and are regulated by them? Secondly what other informal institutions do exist alongside the formal ones? Lastly do these institutions compete, complement, supplement or substitute the formal instituions These kinds of questions show that there is incomplete information on why these illegal practices are sustained as one of the games played by stakeholders within the rules of forest policy.

Secondly, political interference is another area that affects the implementation of forest policy that needs further analysis. This involves elected politicians abusing their powers to interfere in the work of the bureaucrats in the forest sector (Hansen and Lund, 2011). Zulu (2010), found out that politicians were at the forefront of violating

the formal institutions which were laid to protect and conserve the forest resources. Zulu failed to establish the conditions that enable these politicians to establish their own informal rules which exist alongside formal ones, and how they manage to bypass the formal rules of forest policy.

Lastly, Mutimba and Kamoto (2017), and Yaron et al (2011) noted that there is inadequate and enabling policy, legal, and institutional framework to support sustainable charcoal production (Mutimba and Kamoto, 2017) and poor legislation enforcement (Yaron et al, 2011) in Malawi. Yaron et al (2011, p.xiii) pointed out that “that the current policy of banning charcoal production has not only proved ineffective but encourages inefficient illicit charcoaling and produces incentives for corruption. Mutimba and Kamoto (2017) failed to critically analyse what makes the policies inadequate. Yaron et al (2011) on the other hand did not state explicitly why the current policy on banning charcoal is ineffective, and what other factors contribute to the ineffectiveness of the policy. The second question is, why the law on charcoal licensing is not fully enforced?

Literature suffer from several problems as it neglect politics as the games among stakeholders within the implementation of forest policy as one of the main likely contributing factors of the causes of this problem. Less emphasis is put on how the effectiveness of institutions in the forest sector affects the implementation of the forest policy in Malawi.

These studies show a puzzle, as they fail to give answers to some questions with respect to politics as the games within the rules of implementing the forest policy. There are four questions that this study addresses. Firstly, what are the interests of

stakeholders and actors in forest resources in Malawi? Secondly, how do these interests affect the implementation of the forest policy? Thirdly, how effective are the formal and informal institutions? The fourth and the last question is, what are the costs and benefits of having formal and informal institutions in forest policy implementation?

To solve this puzzle, this study adopted a political economy approach to analyse the interest of the relevant stakeholders of the forestry sector, and the effectiveness of the formal and informal institutions to understand how this is contributing to forest degradation in Malawi.

### **1.3 Justification of the study**

In 2015, the Principal Secretary in the office of the President and Cabinet in Malawi admitted that Malawi's deforestation rate has been ranked first in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Kaiya and Banda, 2015). This means that the problem of deforestation is severe in Malawi. This was a sign of a policy failure because the forest policy failed to achieve its desired or intended goals. The studies that have been analysed in the previous section, do not analyse this problem from the perspective of politics in the implementation stage of the forest policy. In addition to this, they do not take on board most of the relevant stakeholders to understand their interest, how their politics within the formal rules of forest policy implementation. In addition to this, they do not take into consideration the politics they play around these formal rules, by creating their own rules in pursuing their interest to achieve their expected goals. This shows that there is a gap that has to be filled in the scholarly literature with respect to the Malawian forestry sector.

## **1.4. Objectives**

### ***1.4.1. Main Objective***

The main objective of this study is to analyse the extent to which politics affects forest policy implementation in Malawi.

### ***1.4.2. Specific Objectives***

1. To assess the interests of various stakeholders in the management of forest resources in Dedza and Zomba.
2. To investigate how different stakeholder's interests affect the implementation of the forest policy in Malawi.
3. To assess the effectiveness of institutions in the management of forest resources in Malawi.
4. To analyse the effects of institutions in the implementation of the forest policy in Malawi.

### ***1.4.3. Research Questions.***

1. What are the interests of various stakeholders in the management of forest resources in Dedza and Zomba?
2. How do the interests of different stakeholders affect the management of forests in Dedza and Zomba?
3. How effective are institutions in the management of forest resources in Dedza and Zomba?
4. How do institutions affect the implementation of the forest policy in Dedza and Zomba?

## **1.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has presented the problem concerning the politics of policy implementation in the forestry sector. It has highlighted that literature suffers from the problem of not using the political economy approach in understanding the causes of the problem of forest degradation in Malawi. In addition to this, the chapter has presented the main objective of the study which is analyse the extent to which politics affects forest policy implementation in Malawi. Lastly, this chapter has justified the worthiness of conducting this study.



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

This chapter analyses the existing literature on what other scholars have written on forests and institutions relating to it. It starts by looking at the existing definitions of the relevant concepts that have been used in this study. These concepts include politics, public policy, and forest.

The second part presents the theory that will be used in this study. This study will use the rational choice institutionalism theory to analyse the politics of policy implementation in the forest sector. This section will go a bit further to discuss the relevance of this theory in this study.

#### **2.2. Conceptual Framework**

This section defines the concepts used in this study. These concepts are politics, policy, and forest. It goes a little further to discuss in depth of their nature and why they are relevant for this study. The rationale for doing this is to appreciate an environment in which the stakeholders interact, and this will make the analysis easier for the findings.

##### ***2.2.1. The Concept of Politics***

Looking at the study of politics, man has always been at the centre stage. Aristotle the Greek philosopher (cited in Patel & Svasand 2007) argued that ‘man is by nature a

political animal'. This means that politics is at the heart of all human activities. The question is what is the nature of this term "politics"?

Many definitions of politics have been given by scholars. It should be noted, however, that these scholars do not agree on one best definition. Magolowondo (cited in Patel & Svasand, 2007) admitted that 'there is no consensus on what exactly is to be understood by politics', which means that politics as a concept cannot be tied to one definition only.

This study has adopted Leftwich's (2008) definition of politics. He defined politics as a process, or sets of linked processes, which are not confined to certain sites or venues (parliaments, congresses, executives or bureaucracies) or specialists (such as princes, politicians or civil servants) or procedures (elections or the delegation of authority) (Leftwich, 2008, p.6). By this Leftwich meant that politics is best conceptualized as consisting of all the many activities of cooperation, conflict and negotiation involved in decisions about the use and production (ibid). In simple words wherever collective and binding decisions about resources are made there is politics and distribution of resources. Leftwich went on to argue that there are two levels which are distinct but related at which politics and political contestation over policy occurs. These are:

- (a) The level which concerns the rules of the game (institutions); and
- (b) The games within the rules.

The first level deals with the making of institutions like policies, acts of parliament, and laws. It is a level where different stakeholders come together and reach a compromise and consensus on the rules that govern and structure their social, political and economic interactions in the society.

The second level deals with how these institutions are enforced. Leftwich argued that it is at this level that normal politics occur. This level is critical because it is where political games are played concerning the established institutions. Some actors or stakeholders may choose to abide by the established rules or to play around them, or against them. It is the level where formal and informal politics are at play. It can also be argued that it is the level where informal politics can be seen to be operating behind, within or in front of formal institutions (Helmke, and Levitsky, 2004).

Ostrom (1990), in her analysis on the institutions governing the resources of the commons, argued that there are rules that determine how actors are going to conduct themselves, in this level of games within the rules. She called these rules operational rules and defined them as institutions that directly affect the day-to-day decisions made by appropriators concerning when, where, and how to withdraw resource units, who should monitor the actions of others and how, what information must be exchanged or withheld, and what rewards or sanctions will be assigned to different combinations of actions and outcomes. This means that the stakeholders of the common resources do have a general idea on how they make their decisions concerning the time to withdraw resources, the places where those resources will be withdrawn, and the means of withdrawing those resources.

Leftwich's definition of politics, particularly in the level of games within the rules is very significant for this study because it simplifies the understanding of the stakeholders' interest, power struggles in the management of forest resources and the games that are played by all stakeholders in the implementation of the forest policy in the forest department.

### *2.2.1.1. Political System in Malawi*

Malawi's political system has been swinging like a pendulum, throughout the historical phases (pre-colonial period, colonial period, pre-independence period, post-independence period, and the multi-party democracy era). Malawi is characterised by patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism. In the years, of 1961 to 1964 she was characterised by a democratic culture, as elections were held in 1961, and it was believed that Malawi was on a good path to consolidating democracy (Magolowondo, 2013). The political climate changed in Malawi with the the 'Cabinet Crisis' of 1964, when younger ministers refused to support some of his domestic- and foreign-policy measures (McCracken, 2012). This resulted in several dismissals, some resignations, and a failed coup attempt. Kayuni and Tambulasi (2010), described this as marking the beginning of a Banda-centred political culture in the country, this was the true origin of the Banda dictatorship (McCracken, 2012). The cabinet crisis legacy has a profound effect on the nature of Malawian politics and its culture. This led to the institutionalization of neopatrimonial culture which is characterised by centralization of power, clientelism authoritarianism, paternalism and repression, economic relations of domination and exploitation (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2010).

This has left a negative political legacy in Malawi which is characterised by governments which essentially function as a transfer pump of resources by political leaders to their respective clients in return for support (Chinsinga 2011). Leaders and their opponents use both formal and informal rules, norms and practices to gain legitimacy and advantage in a winner takes all competition for the control of the state (Chinsinga, 2011). The state is the primary source of wealth the underlying logic is that chances of rapid wealth accumulation are enhanced if ethnic groups or regions

elect one of their own into the State House Political parties are therefore simply used as tools to gain power, run clientelist networks, select and control MPs and do little to aggregate public interest (Magolowondo, 2013).

In recent years stakeholders have tried to trim the powers of the president very little success has been achieved in trimming the powers of the President, who has enormous powers to appoint a wide range of senior staff in government without viable systems of checks and balances. These appointments have made these senior staff to bow down to the demands of the president and the senior party members which the president belongs (Chinsinga 2011).

The relative autonomy of a president is further reinforced by the weakness of both civil society movements and the private sector. Chinsing (2013), noted that, the civil society in Malawi is not only weak, but they are also reactionary in their advocacy.

In addition to the above arguments, traditional chiefs in Malawi have been, and it should be expected that they will be at the centre stage of politics in Malawi (Patel and Svasand, 2013). For example, the former President Muluzi used chiefs to drum up support for his third term bid (Chinsinga, 2011)). Similarly, chiefs were being used to legitimize the candidacy of Peter Mutharika ahead of the May 2014 polls (Chinsinga, 2011). For this reason, Chinsinga (2011), noted that chiefs are enmeshed in a patron-client relationship practically with any government that comes to power. The chiefs are considered as an integral part of the Executive branch of government and their motto is serving the government of the day (ibid).

### ***2.2.2. The Concept of Public Policy***

Public policy is also one of the very contested subjects in politics where scholars do not agree on a common definition. This section will focus on two definitions of public policy as given by Jenkins and Anderson. These definitions are both similar and different at the same time due to their approach in their description of public policy.

Jenkins defined public policy as a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them, within a specified situation where those decisions should in principle be within the power of those actors to achieve (Howlett et al, 2009). This definition clearly explains that certain decisions are taken by one actor, government, to achieve clearly defined goals. For example, Agrawal (2003) argued that other resources are vast and do not have identifiable boundaries. Agrawal qualified these resources to be managed under state resources regimes. This is the case as the management of such resources requires a high investment of resources. It should be acknowledged here that some states do not have enough financial resources to protect and manage natural resources.

On the other hand, Jenkins went on to describe that some public problems require a group of actors or stakeholders to work together to deal with them. An example of such problems is “wicked problems”. Dewulf et al (2007) argued that wicked problems require several actors or stakeholders to come and work together to successfully deal with the problem. The problems facing forests around the world is one of the examples of these wicked problems. Umazi et al (2016) found out that the secret of Tanzania’s successful implementation of its forest policy in dealing with these wicked problems was because of active participation of all stakeholders and

actors in the management of forest resources at both local and national level in pursuing a common national interest in conserving the forest.

The weakness of the definition by Jenkins is that not all decisions are interrelated. In his definition of public policy Jenkins presents the idea that all the decisions that are made in public policy are related to paper, which is not always the case in reality. In most cases the making of public policy is influenced by politics and the present environment it is operating in (Hallsworth et al 2011). Due to the interest that the stakeholders may have, the politicians in government, in particular, end up making decisions that are not related to serving their interest.

This study adopts the definitions given by Jenkins. This definition was significant for this study because it does recognise that the public policymaking process involves several actors and that in a number of these actors the government carries the responsibility of formulating and implementing the policies. It should be noted, however, that the government do implement these policies with the help of other stakeholders.

### ***2.2.3. Politics and Policy nexus in Malawi***

According to the 2016 Malawi forest policy, the main objective of these institutions is

(a) to identify and manage areas permanent forest cover as protection or production forest in order to maintain environmental stability; to prevent resource degradation and to increase social and economic benefits;

(b) to augment, protect and manage trees and forest on customary land in order to meet basic fuelwood and forest produce needs of local communities and for the conservation of soil and water;

- (c) to promote community involvement in the conservation of trees and forests in forest reserves and protected forest areas in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
- (d) to empower village natural resources management committees to source financial and technical assistance from the private sector, Non -Governmental Organisations and other organizations;
- (e) to promote sustainable utilization of timber, fuelwood and other forest produce;
- (f) to promote optimal and land use through agroforestry in smallholder farming systems;
- (g) to upgrade the capability of forestry institutions in the implementation of their resource management responsibilities and in development of human resources in forestry;
- (h) to control trafficking in wood and other forestry produce including exportation and importation;
- (i) to protect fragile areas such as steep slopes, river banks, water catchment and to conserve and enhance biodiversity;
- (j) to provide guidelines in planning and implementation of forestry research and forestry education;
- (k) to establish a forestry administration; and
- (l) to promote bilateral, regional and international co-operation in forest augmentation and conservation.



The forest policy summarises this by mentioning that its purpose is to improve the provision of forest goods and services to contribute towards the sustainable development of Malawi through the protection and conservation of forest resources. The policy aspires to control deforestation and forest degradation.

The implementation of these institutions is entrusted with the forest department. The argument is that the forest department should take the leading role as a part of the government in enforcing and implementing these institutions as rules (Howlett et al, 2013). According to the 2016 Malawi Forest Policy, to achieve these objectives the forest department has to work with the other stakeholders of the forest resources to make sure that they take their part in the management of the forest institutions and also abide by the rules of managing forests in Malawi. These stakeholders include politicians which include the ministers who head the line ministry to which the forest department is attached to, the cooperatives, these are a group of people involved in timber business who come together as a group and are contracted to help in the management of trees, in return they are given licences to harvest timber, people who pay for a general receipt or tickets to harvest trees, and traditional chiefs whose jurisdiction is close to the protected forest reserves, and also have Village Forest Areas.

But these stakeholders do have different interests which make the implementation of forest institutions to be effective or not. These interests determine whether the implementation of the forest formal institutions to be effective or not. Mulwafu (2010), noted that the interests of the relevant stakeholders affected the effective implementation of soil conservation laws by the colonial government. This was the

case because the colonial government itself in Malawi, the estate owners, traditional chiefs who were helping them in enforcing the laws, and the natives had different interest. As a result of this the effective implementation of the soil conservation laws were negatively affected. This highlighted the significance taking into account the interests of all the relevant stakeholders of institutions and policies in particular (Peters, 2019).

In modern Malawi in this multi-party democracy era in particular, policy choices and modalities of implementation can be understood by looking at the incentives produced by the formal and informal political institutions that characterize the distribution and organization of power (Chinsinga, 2011). Chinsinga (2011) noted that contrary to the highly stylized good governance perspective, policy processes are less of a linear sequence but more of a political process underpinned by a complex mesh of interactions and ramifications between a wide range of stakeholders who are driven and constrained by competing interests and the context in which they operate.

With respect to the above arguments, it should be known that democracies may or may not promote technocratic policy making that responds to the priority interests of the public (Chinsinga, 2011). This is the case because politicians do prefer policies that benefit a large number of people in the short term and are highly visible such as social policies. As a result to further their political interests they deliver clientelist privileges rather than the more unattainable development or even public goods (Ibid). This implies that elections could be a double edged sword in the policy processes. Chinsinga (2011), further argued that in a democratic dispensation within a neopatrimonial context, elections do reinforce neopatrimonial institutions rather

counteracting them. This is the case because political survival is the key motivation for the ruling elites who are interested in maintaining ruling coalitions in order to win elections. This motivation dictates the kind of policies elites choose and how they are implemented, as a result, this has legitimised a political culture that promotes subservience and obedience to authority without question (Chinsinga 2011). In addition to this there is crowding out of opportunities for policy dialogue that could further strengthen the technical soundness and viability of policy options (ibid). This clearly displays that Political in leaders care less about the technical viability of the policies but more about whether the policies will be able to deliver desired electoral outcomes to access and maintain themselves in power.

### **2.2.3. Forests**

This part of the paper gives the relevant definitions of forest. In addition to this, it gives a deep description of the forest as a resource and goes further to analyse the type of resource the forest is. The last part of this section analyses the types of forest management in Malawi and its historical context.

#### *2.2.3.1. Definition of forest*

There are many definitions of forest in literature by different scholars. For the sake of this study, only two definitions will be used for defining the term forest. First, International Union of Forest Research Organizations defined a forest as an area of land with a minimum 10 % tree crown coverage (or equivalent stocking level), or formerly having such tree cover and that is being naturally or artificially regenerated or that is being afforested (Chazdon et al, 2016, p. 5). On the other hand, the Forest Resources Assessment of Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations gave a slightly different definition, they defined the forest as a land spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees higher than meters and a canopy cover of more than 10

percent, or trees able to reach these thresholds in situ. This definition went on to describe the forest as one which includes land that is predominantly under agricultural or urban land use (Forest resources Assessment, 2012).

The convergence of the two definitions is that they all agree that firstly, the forest consists of the part of the land which is covered by trees. Secondly, they also agree that this canopy coverage should consist of 10% . These definitions diverge on the quantity of land which can be said to be a forest, the height of trees and the activities taking place on the land which can disqualify some pieces of land as being named as forests. The Forest Resources Assessment clearly defined a forest as a land spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees. They go on to specify that these trees should be higher than 5 meters. The Forest Resources Assessment take a step further from Charzdon et al (2016), in excluding agricultural practices and activities and urban activities on the land. The weakness of the Forest Resources Assessment's definition is that it does not specify what these urban activities are. Despite their weaknesses, both definitions were adopted for this study for their relevance.

#### *2.2.3.2. Management of Forests*

Forests as resources can be classified as common-pool resources due to their high levels of subtractability/exhaustibility and low levels of exclusivity (Wendell, 2004). On the other hand, forest resources are said to be private goods when their subtractability/exhaustibility is high and the level of exclusivity is also high. Due to the nature of the characteristics of forests discussed above, it is rational for the forests resources that are vast and do not have identifiable boundaries to be managed under State resources regimes, if sustainability of these resources is to be realised (Agrawal, 2003). scholars have advocated for state property rights as the best way to manage

forest resources sustainably. The argument here is that common pool resources are open to everyone and if not regulated they can be exhausted easily.

#### *2.2.3.3. Forest Resource Management in Malawi*

During the colonial period in Malawi, the communal forest scheme was launched by creating Village Forest Areas (VFAs) under the control of local headmen and for local use (Mauambeta, 2010). This motivated the local communities and the local chiefs to take an active role in protecting and management of VFAs (Kayambazinthu, 2000). Mauambeta (2010) noted that re-afforestation attempts failed to successfully restore forests this was due to the low survival rate of the planted trees (Kayambazinthu, 2000). This was attributed to lack of expertise on the suitability of trees planted in the area among the stakeholders. The proportion of 75% revenue collected from VFAs share was going to the local council, this made the local councils take an active role in the effective management and protection of local forests at the periphery.

Malawian Forestry Department was once praised in the mid-20th century throughout Southern Africa for its professionalism. This was a result of the control of the colonial forestry by expatriates, who used their expertise to focus on developing plantations of exotics (mostly pines and eucalyptus) and on protecting forests (Mayers et al, 2001. p. 15). This development showed that the competency and expertise of the forest officers are critical for good management and conservation of forest resources.

During the authoritarian regime, the management of the forests in Malawi changed. The local councils stopped getting revenue collected from the management of local forests and this demotivated them (Mauambeta, 2010). The local chiefs' incentives to participate in the conservation of forests and the responsibility for forestry extension

was placed in the hands of Agricultural Extension workers who had little knowledge about forestry. This negatively affected the management and conservation of VFAs.

In the period of Authoritarian and pre-democratic state, there was a large scale extraction of timber and firewood that took place due to pressure from the central government to generate more revenue, this negatively affected forest resources. In addition to this, there was Widespread corruption involving Forestry staff (Mauambeta, 2010). The positive development in the conservation of forests took place to deal with the severe corruption among forest officers. Severe punishments for those caught violating forest rules were established (Mayers et al, 2001). This, in turn, helped to conserve trees.

The multi-party era has been characterised by chaos in the management of forests. Mauamabeta (2010) pointed out that the first five years of the multiparty democracy were characterized by euphoria, which destroyed timber plantations and escalation of deforestation through charcoal production on both private and customary land, for example, Ndirande Timber Plantation in Blantyre disappeared within two years after attaining the multiparty system of government (in 1994). Mauambeta (2010) did not explicitly state the causes of this problem of deforestation. Walkers and Peters (2001) argued that democratisation in Malawi accelerated deforestation with “a euphoric sense that ‘democracy’ means the overthrowing of all confining rules of the old regime. In addition to this Walkers and Peters (2001), also noted that there was a lack of enthusiasm among political leaders for enforcing the forest rules and regulations, this was the case because the politicians were protecting their political popularity interest in the eyes of the public. On top of this, there was a reduction in state enforcement capacities. (ibid). This resulted in inadequate management which in turn increased fire incidences among other things (Maumabeta, 2010).

### **2.3 Studies on the politics of forest policy implementation.**

Several studies have been conducted in the politics of forest policy implementation. This discussion will include an analysis of some of the games played concerning informal and formal rules, locally and abroad.

Chakravarty et al, (2012) and Le Bellion (2002) found out that illegal forest practices were one of the games that are played in the management of forest resources. In their articles, they defined these illegal forest practices as activities that may include the approval of illegal contracts with private enterprises by forestry officers, illegal sale of harvesting permits, under-declaring volumes cut in the public forest, under-pricing of wood in concessions, harvesting of protected trees by commercial corporations, smuggling of forest products across borders and allowing illegal logging and processing forest raw materials without a license due to patronage and rent-seeking. The weaknesses with the studies done by Chakravarty et al, (2012) and Le Bellion (2002) is that they leave several questions unanswered. one of these questions is: why do these informal institutions exist alongside formal institutions?

It has been established that incentives play a role in the games within the rules of forest policies. Incentives do compel politicians to use forest resources as an instrument for gaining political mileage, and forest officers to capitalise on personal gains. Anderson (2006) and Zhang and Peake (2012) found out that incentives play an important role in influencing political leaders and forest officers in taking measures that lead to sustainable management and protection of forest resources. The study conducted by Anderson (2006) and Zhang and Peake (2013), do not include institutions that can influence other stakeholders to comply with these institutions. Another weakness is that these studies cannot be applied to a Malawian context

because of the differences in political systems, and what can be taken to be incentives to help protect and conserve forest resources.

Political interference is another game that takes place in the implementation of forest policy. Hansen and Lund (2011) argued that politicians abuse their powers by adopting policies that are economically irrational, ineffective and inefficient for the forest sector for their political benefits. They are willing to sacrifice economic rationality to achieve the latter objective. What appears to be a policy failure from an economic point of view may, therefore, constitute a political success for these politicians (ibid).

For example, in Ghana politicians intervened in the forest sector by granting favours to particular agents and individuals in a system of political patronage, where those bestowed with special opportunities provide “pay-backs” in the form of votes or campaign contributions (Hansen and Lund, 2011). This was done through the adoption of taxation regimes, discretionary allocation of logging rights, maintaining low forest rates and even exempting other companies and other people of forest tax fees (Hansen and Lund, 2011). Another example from Ghana involved politicians intervening in the management of the forests, and this negatively affected the sector in forest conservation (Hansen and Lund, 2011).

Umazi, Blessings and Alyegba (2016), found out that the secret of Tanzania’s successful implementation of its forest policy was because of its institutions which allow active participation of all stakeholders at both local and national level in pursuing a common national interest in conserving the forest. Their argument was based on the premise that, because all stakeholders were involved in the implementation of the policy, it left no room for other actors to act in ways that led to



forest degradation. Umazi et al (2016) failed to give a clear explanation on how issues of corruption and bribery that were affecting the forest sector in Tanzania, leading to forest governance shortfalls were dealt with (Milledge, 2010). It can be argued that in all circumstances, it is not only structures or institutions that shape the behaviour of actors, but there might also be other factors that may be involved such as the rational choice of these individuals (Peters, 1999)

Larson and Ribot (2007) on the other hand argued that forest policies are implemented by local elites to maximise and extract profits at their interest at the expense of poor rural people living close to these forest in Honduras and Senegal. They argued that forestry and broader regulatory policies continue to favour urban-based and local elite access to forest resources or resource benefits at the expense of local smallholders and the rural poor who face severe biases in implementation of these regulatory policies (Larson and Ribot, 2007).

In analysing the politics involved in the management of forest resources Larson and Ribot highlighted that the politics of having rights to access to forests, by giving quota's and auctions has led to informal institutions being used by the actors in advancing their interests through illegal logging which has negatively affected forest conservation. In addition to this it was also noted that commercial logging interests fix auction rates in secret meetings, cut trees without management plans and log outside of designated areas, including in protected and other prohibited areas, at least some of this in collusion with Honduran Forestry Development Corporation (COHDEFOR) and other public officials (Larson and Ribot, 2007). In practice, the quota was based on the previous year's quota, which is lowered or raised depending on various political considerations. Ribot (2007) found that over the past decade, the quota had

been lowered almost every year regardless of demand, thus increasing illegal production (since the demand was always met).

A similar argument on the interest of stakeholders was raised by Culhane (2011), who demonstrated how in the United States of America some actors could influence the adoption and the implementation of forest policies by the government to their advantage. The weakness of Culhane argument is that it does not explain the weaknesses or ineffectiveness of the institutions that should be there to regulate, enable and constrain certain kinds of behaviour and interest. The question is how do actors outwit these institutions, and how do these institutions fail to achieve their intended results.

Le Billon (2002), found out that the elite's politics was one of the factors affecting the exploitation of forests in Cambodia through illegal logging. In this study, Le Billon found out that the state was involved in conducting "formal" and "shadow state" politics where business deals were passed without public announcement or bidding, and taxation on logging was reduced to increase informal profits. All political parties both ruling and opposition parties, were involved in forest degradation and deforestation through careless illegal logging.

This article by Le Billon can be criticised for only emphasizing how both politics and informal institutions negatively affected the forest in Cambodia in chaotic environments as it was in transition to peace. Despite its significance it is difficult to explain why illegal logging is still taking place and corruption and bribes are still fuelling forest exploitation in peaceful countries like Tanzania and Malawi.

In Malawi, several games are played in the management of forest resources. Kambewa et al (2007) and Yaron et al (2011) found out that corruption and bribery

rank among the games encouraging illegal deforestation, and illegal charcoal production and selling games. Kambewa et al (2007), noted that most of the forest and police officers were involved in the game of corruption and taking bribes from charcoal producers and transporters. The question is, why would forest officers and police officers, who are supposed to be law enforcers and protect forest resources, involve themselves in bribery and corruption?

Mutimba and Kamoto (2017), and Yaron et al (2011) attributed this problem of forest degradation to Inadequate enabling policy, legal, and institutional framework to support sustainable charcoal production (Mutimba and Kamoto, 2017), and poor legislation enforcement (Yaron et al, 2011). Yaron et al (2011, p.xiii) They argued that the current policy of banning charcoal production has proved to be ineffective and encourages inefficient illicit charcoaling and produces incentives for corruption”. Mutimba and Kamoto (2017) failed to critically analyse what makes the policies inadequate and suggesting a solution to the inadequacy of the enabling policies. Yaron et al on the other hand did not state explicitly why the current policy on banning charcoal is ineffective, and what other factors contribute to the ineffectiveness of the policies.

The last game is the abuse of power by elected representatives in the implementation of forest policy. Zulu (2010) found out that politicians were at the forefront, violating forest formal institutions. For example Zulu (2010) noted that the minister responsible for forestry was in 2003 implicated in illicit charcoal transportation; Secondly, he found out that Politicians often reclaimed impounded produce or trucks, and supported illegal charcoal production and transportation for political gain (Zulu, 2010). Zulu failed to establish how these politicians establish their own informal rules

which exist alongside formal ones, and how they manage to bypass the formal rules of forest policy.

## **2.4. Theoretical Framework.**

This study adopted a rational choice institutionalism theory in its analysis by Guy Peters (1999). This theory was appropriate for this study as it analyses the institutions, interests of the actors or stakeholders to comply with the institutions, and the rationale behind their behaviours in the implementation of forest policy.

### ***2.4.1. The Concept of Institutions***

Institutions are humanly devised rules that structure political, economic and social interaction (North, 1991). This means that institutions prescribe ways and means in which every player, actor or member of that society is expected to follow. Peters (1999), argues that institutions create greater regularities in human behaviour in a society. Peters argument was that at practical level institutions do have a capacity to mould individual behaviour and reduce the uncertainty that otherwise dominates much of social life. Dulani (2011), concurs with Peters (1999) in that institutions comprise of rules and practices that stipulate appropriate behaviour. There are two different types of institutions, and these are Formal Institutions and Informal Institutions.

#### ***2.4.1.1. Formal institutions***

formal institutions can be defined as a set of rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Examples of these institutions include laws codified in constitutions, Acts of parliament, government policies and penal codes. Formal institutions are said to be enforced by the third party which is the state. These

institutions are the ones which Leftwich (2007), referred to as the level at which politics do take place in the level of the “rules of the game”. These rules are the ones that are created by all stakeholders through negotiations, compromise and consensus.

#### *2.4.1.2. Informal institutions*

In the course of studying the effects of institutions, much emphasis is put on formal institutions, and less on informal institutions. Dulani (2010.p. 15) argued that “the lack of attention paid to the role of informal institutions seriously restricts our ability to understand this particular phenomenon. Informal institutions can be defined as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Informal institutions differ from formal institutions on enforcement. Informal institutions are enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels by the actors who are stakeholders to them (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Some examples of informal institutions include corruption, clientelism, Nepotism and taking bribes. Despite the lack of formalization, informal institutions can create an environment in which incentives for complying with formal rules are created, strengthened, or negated (Dulani, 2010). To appreciate this argument, Mauambeta (2010) observed that there was widespread corruption among forest officers in the period between 1986 to 1994, this clearly shows how forest officers who are supposed to be law abiders and enforcers can negate in complying with the laws governing the management of forest resources. Ostrom (1990) came up with a type of institution which is a prototype of an informal institution called working rules. Working rules were defined as those used, monitored, and enforced when individuals make choices about the actions they will take (Ostrom, 1990).

According to the arguments raised in this section, this study is of the view that informal institutions can be an important tool in providing alternative understandings and explanations to what drives actors' incentive and expectations in political activities like policy processes which are mostly assumed to be shaped primarily sometimes exclusively by formal rules (Dulani, 2010).

#### *2.4.1.3. Institutional Bricolage*

Institutional bricolage is a process through which people, actors or stakeholders of a given institution or institutions do consciously and non-consciously, assemble or reshape this/these institutional arrangements, using whatever materials and resources that are available to them, regardless of the original purpose of the institutions (Cleaver & De Koning, 2015). These adapted configurations of rules and practices adopted to serve a particular interest of the actors involved in the institutional bricolage. Institutional Bricolage is intertwined with the human agency because actors do strategize, innovate and negotiate in their engagement with institutions and management of natural resources (Cleaver & De Koning, 2015). In addition to this, there are power dynamics, which include the power to influence the societal allocation of resources (through governance arrangements), the power adhering to particular social and political roles, functions and regulations, and the power to challenge boundaries or to resist and subvert institutional arrangements.

The knowledge of institutional bricolage had been of great importance for this study because as it has helped to understand how other institutions within the formal institutions in the forest policy have been crafted, and for the purpose and interest they serve. This is because the crafting of institutions suggests that specific institutions are deliberately developed for particular functions. Secondly, it has helped in understanding the issue of power relations among stakeholders and how this

determines the adherence to the formal rules or challenge the boundaries or resist and subvert institutional arrangements in the forest sector.

#### ***2.4.2. Theories of institutions***

There are different types of institutional theories, that give explanations to questions on institutions. These questions include: what are institutions, and why do institutions exist? How are these institutions formed? How and when do they change? Lastly, they try to answer the question about a good institution? The theory of institutionalism is divided into two: the old institutionalism theory and the new institutionalism theory. This study will focus on new institutionalism. Under new institutionalism theories, theories are classified into six categories as given by Guy Peters (1999). These theories falling under new institutionalism include Rational Choice Institutionalism, historical institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, institutions of Interest representation and international institutionalism. This study adopted the Rational Choice institutionalism to be used in the analysis of data.

#### ***2.4.3. Rational Choice Institutionalism***

Rational choice institutionalism is a theory that marries ideas from rational choice theory and institutionalism. The argument laid down by rational choice institutionalist is that political life occurs within institutions and that institutions are viewed as collections of rules and incentives that establish the conditions for bounded rationality and therefore creates an environment in which all political actors can function (Peters, 1999). The extension of the argument of this theory is that Individual actors are expected to maximise their interest but their options are constrained by the set of institutions in which they operate. This theory does emphasize the arguments laid down by the rational choice theorist that utility maximisation is and will remain

to be the primary motivation of the individuals; but they extend a little further that these individuals may realise that these goals can only be achieved effectively through institutional action and that their behaviour is shaped by these institutions (Peters, 2019). These institutions are designed in such a way that they produce more socially desirable outcomes.

Rational choice institutionalism defines institutionalism as an aggregation of rules with members of the organization agreeing to follow those rules in exchange for such benefits as they can derive from their membership within the structure (Peters, 2019). From the perspective of rationality, institutions provide a stable means of making choices in what would otherwise be an extremely contentious political environment.

Individuals within these organizations do attempt to utilize institutions to fulfil their goals. Peters (1999) was of the view that individuals, deliberately create institutions to control others, while these institutions serve their interest. The argument here is that individuals do play around these institutions, manipulating them in such a way that they help them achieve their desired goals or interests. For example, Peters (1999) noted that leaders of bureaucratic organizations in government use their positions to derive personal utility usually through instruments such as large budgets and larger allocation of personnel.

This theory does recognise the problem of incomplete and asymmetric information organizations both public and private institutions where the principals rely on an agent to act on the principal's behalf. For example, in indirect democracy, citizens rely on their elected representatives to make and execute policies on their behalf. Another example can be between the ministers and the principal secretaries in the executive branch of government (Clark et al, 2013). The principal-agent relationship is



recommended as it helps the principal to benefit from the expertise of the agent, and secondly, it helps the principal to accomplish his or her desired goals with reduced personal effort.

One of the problems of the principal-agent relationship relevant to this study is the moral hazard. A moral hazard problem occurs when the agent has the opportunity to take actions that are hidden from the principal (Clark et al, 2013). The argument here is that the agent manoeuvres to maximise their utilities or interest at the expense of the organization or the principals despite the presence of the institutions to constrain their behaviour. The politics here is that agents do have more expertise than the principals, as such they find a weakness within the institutions and capitalise on them to achieve their interest without being caught by the principals.

This study has adopted rational choice institutionalism theory to help understand the politics in the implementation of forest policy. The rationale behind choosing rational choice institutionalism is that it helped the researcher to understand and interpret the games behind the crafting, and adoption of some informal institutions by stakeholders in the implementation of the forest policy. This theory is significant for this study because it has helped in addressing the questions about interest as one of the factors determining the games that these stakeholders do play in their choice and course of actions.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has firstly discussed the definitions of the main concepts that have been used in this study, which are politics, public policy and forests. In addition to this, it has also presented the relevant literature that showed the gap that is there with regard

to the study of the politics of policy implementation in the forestry sector in Malawi.

Lastly, this study discussed the rational choice institutionalism theory, which has been used in the analysis of the findings of this study.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

This chapter will discuss and analyse various methods that were adopted by the researcher in studying this research and the logic behind them. This study adopted qualitative research methods. The choice of qualitative methods as a research design was based on the nature of the research questions under this study. The study also aimed at getting in-depth explanations on the interests of stakeholders in the management of forest resources, how these interests affect the conservation of forest resources, the effectiveness of forest institutions and their effect on the conservation of forest resources. Random sampling was used to select the two study areas of Dedza and Zomba mountain forest reserve.

#### **3.3. Study design**

This study adopted a cross-sectional design. Under this design a study takes place at a particular time (Saunders et al 2009), and this study was planned to only happen once in 2020. Under this research design, the researcher used primary data. On research approach this study adopted This study adopted the qualitative research method as a means to obtain knowledge relevant to this study. This method was adopted because the researcher's objective is to interact with those being studied, in an attempt to reveal their attitudes, ideas, customs, beliefs and behaviour and experiences that the stakeholders have in the institutions that govern the implementation of the forest policy in Malawi, where the games within these rules are played (Mason, 2014).

### 3.4. Study Area



**Figure 1: Some part of Dedza mountain forest plantation**



**Figure 2: A part of Zomba mountain forest reserve plantation**

The study was conducted in two districts namely: Dedza and Zomba. The selection of these sites was arrived at with regard to the main objective of this study, which was

analysing the effects of politics in the implementation of the forest policy in Malawi. This study was interested in two large forest reserves under the management of the forest department, which could provide the needed data on politics over forest resources management among several stakeholders, and whose data should be compared for this research. Several potential study areas were outlined by Mauambeta (2010) as worth study areas where one may conduct his research on the politics of forest policy implementation due to the high stakes that stakeholders have on the withdrawal of forest policies. The possible study areas as outlined by Mauambeta (2010) included: Viphya plantations, Mulanje mountain forest reserve, Dzalanyama forest reserve, Zomba mountain forest reserve, Liwonde forest reserve, Phirilongwe, Dedza and Mchinji forest reserve.

To come up with the two study sites of Dedza and Zomba, a simple random sampling was used to avoid being biased. Simple random sampling was used by writing the names of these forest reserves and plantations on small pieces of paper. Then these papers were folded and put in a box. The box was closed and the papers were shuffled by shaking the box. Then the researcher randomly picked two papers. These turned out to be Dedza and Zomba. This is how the researcher arrived at the selection of the sites. A comparative study was undertaken in the forests reserves of Dedza and Zomba.

The two sites were selected for comparison purposes in the analysis of the data collected. This study adopted a similar systems design for comparison, which means that the two political systems of Zomba and Dedza, which in this case are similar and comparable (Jackson and Jackson, 1997). Firstly the two sites qualified because they are close to centres where economic activities do take place. For example, the Dedza forest is close to town, and Zomba forest is close to Zomba city. Secondly, both these

forests are all in the category of plantations. As plantations, Mauambeta (2010) categorised them as one of the forests that are highly associated with political games among stakeholders in the level of games within the rules of politics. For example, Mauambeta (2010) included the two study sites in the category of some of the centres where corruption concerning the management of forest resources was happening. And Lastly, the two sites were favourable to conduct the study because they both employed cooperatives to take part in the management of the forests in the area which makes these sites worth conducting a study in. These factors helped the researcher to learn if their locations have any determining factor in influencing the stakeholders on how they behave concerning the management of forest resources. The assumption was that the two forests have similar stakeholders who share a common interest in forest resources. These stakeholders include forest officers, cooperatives, people who collect the products and leftovers of timber for business and people involved in the charcoal business.

### **3.5. Study participants**

The study included the following stakeholders of the forest resources: the forest officers both working and retired, those involved in timber, charcoal burning and selling business, traditional leaders, police officers, and local council officers. These participants were purposively included in this study because they have interests, and interact with each other in the use and the management of the forest resources. Forest officers were selected because, by law, they take a leading role in the protection and the management of forests in Malawi. The people and companies involved in the timber and charcoal business have been taken on board because they not only use the forest resources but they also do interact with the forest officers and other actors like forest and police officers as they conduct and transporting logs, charcoal, and even

during charcoal production. Traditional leaders were involved in this study because they do play a role to make sure that forests within their jurisdiction are protected. Local council officers were included in this study because they do take part in the management of forest resources and are responsible for controlling markets where these forest resources are sold.

Because this study aimed at analysing the effects of politics in the implementation of policy in the forestry sector, it was imperative that the stakeholders mentioned in this section should be involved in the study, to gain more insights with respect to their interaction in the implementation stage of the forest policy and the games they play and the rules they abide by.

### **3.6. Sample size**

This study had a sample size of 29 interviews. During the conduct of the interviews, the study interviewed 18 people involved in the business of timber and charcoal. This number represents 9 people from Zomba and 9 people from Dedza.

### **3.5. Sampling techniques**

This study used purposive and snowball sampling, to identify the participants such as forest officers, people involved in timber and charcoal business, traditional leaders and politicians (Kothari, 2004). Snowball sampling, on the other hand, was used “in rare cases when the population of interest could not be identified other than by someone who knew that a certain person has the necessary experience or characteristics to be included” (Nayak and Singh, 2015 p. 84). Snowball sampling was adopted ease the work of searching respondents in cases where it was difficult to identify the required respondents to participate in the study. An example of such a case was a scenario in which the researcher was in an area where he did not know the

other people involved in the timber business. In this case, the researcher was asking the respondents to help him identify or to lead him to another participant.

### **3.7. Data collection instruments/tools**

This study used semi-structured and key informant interviews as data collection instruments. Semi-structured interviews were used for participants involved in timber, charcoal burning and selling business. On the other hand, key informant interviews were used for collecting data from forest officers, police officers, traditional leaders and elected politicians. These were targeted because of their expertise, knowledge and the role they play in the management of trees in the forests of Zomba and Dedza. In conducting these interviews, the researcher used interview guides for both semi-structured and key informant interviews.

These instruments are examples of some of the tools used in collecting data for qualitative studies. They were appropriate tools for this study because the researcher wanted to know specific information and gather more insights concerning the management of forest resources, which can be compared and contrasted (Dawson, 2007). To do this, the same interview guides were used in each interview per each homogenous group of the participants. In addition to this, the researcher wanted the interviews to be as flexible as possible.

In addition to the above methods for collecting data this study used. The Malawi Forest Policy and act as one of the primary sources of data were used in the analysis of data. These two will be adopted because the study is focusing on how the implementation of the two is being affected by politics, as a result it was imperative to include the two.

### **3.8. Data Analysis**



Content analysis has been used in analysing the data that was collected in this study. This involved categorization of verbal or behavioural data of the study, for purposes of classification, summarization and tabulation (Hancock, 1998). In addition to this, the data that was collected was arranged in common themes obtained from interviews, observations, which helped in concluding them. This made data analysis easier for interpretation.

### **3.9. Ethical consideration**

This section covers the strategies that were adopted by the researcher of this study to make sure that data collection for this study was done professionally and successfully, without doing harm or violating any rights of the respondents, by making sure that they participated freely and were able to express their views in this study without being forced to do so.

All rules pertaining to ethical considerations were followed. Firstly, the approval of this study was sought from the University of Malawi Research Ethics Committee (UNIMAREC).

Secondly, on the part of the respondents, they were asked for their consent at the beginning of the interview. The researcher did this by introducing himself to the respondent. Then he gave a summary of the nature of the study to the respondent.

Lastly, on confidentiality the researcher did the following: firstly, the researcher made sure that the place where the interview was conducted was conducive enough to allow them to participate in the interview freely. Secondly, no names were taken down or recorded or allowed to be mentioned during the interview by the respondent. In addition to this, to avoid violating the respondent's right to privacy, no names of the respondent appeared or will appear in the papers of this study. The respondents were

informed that the information that the researcher will learn and get from them will be used for academic purposes only. At the end of informing the respondent about the study, the respondents were informed about the significance of his or her participation, the confidentiality of the study. Lastly, the respondents were asked if he or she may wish to participate in the interview. All these were done to make sure that no harm was done to the respondents, before, during and after the interview.

### **3.10. Limitation**

Firstly, this research had limited financial resources. Consequently, data was collected from a few forests in Malawi, namely Zomba and Dedza. Secondly, the Corona Virus pandemic delayed the conduction of this study, because most of the relevant offices, from which the -researcher applied for ethical clearance, and the offices from which the stakeholders participating in this study worked, were not working or opened normally. This negatively affected this study because it delayed data collection.

### **3.11. Conclusion**

This chapter has presented the methodology adopted by this qualitative study, and this approach has been adopted deliberately because the researcher's objective is to interact with those being studied, in an attempt to reveal their attitudes, ideas, customs, beliefs and behaviour and experiences that the stakeholders have in the institutions that govern the implementation of the forest policy in Malawi, where the games within these rules are played. In addition to this, it has also presented the study areas that this study took place, which are Dedza and Zomba forest plantation, and the simple random sampling was used as the criteria for choosing those study areas. This chapter has also presented the sample size of 29 participants,

and the study participants that this study engaged who are forest officers, police officers, people involved in timber and charcoal business, and traditional leaders, and these participants were engaged because they interact in the management of the forest resources.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

#### **4.1. Introduction**

This chapter presents the findings and the discussion of the data that was collected from Dedza and Zomba mountain forests reserves on the politics of policy implementation in Malawi's forestry sector. The rational choice institutionalism theory and other relevant literature have been used in this discussion. The presentation of findings and discussion will be done in the order of the specific research objectives of this study. In summary, this presentation of findings and the discussion will be based on the interest of the stakeholders on forest resources, the effects of these interest on forest resources, the effectiveness of the formal and informal institutions governing forest resources and the cost and benefits of these formal and informal institutions.

#### **4.2. Interest of various stakeholders in the management of forest in Dedza and Zomba mountain forest reserve.**

The study's first objective aimed at finding the motives that each of the stakeholders has on forest resources in dealing with the first objective of finding out the interest of these stakeholders on forest resources. To do this, the study looked at the incentives that are there to motivate these stakeholders in using forest resources. This section

will discuss, compare and contrast the interests of the stakeholders from both Dedza and Zomba Mountain forests.

#### ***4.2.1. The interest of People Involved in the business of timber and charcoal in Dedza and Zomba***

The respondents had a common response to the question relating to why they do their business with respect to trees from the forest. It was learnt that they chose this kind of business because it helps them to take care of their lives and their families. One of the respondents involved in firewood business in Dedza stated that

*“Makolo anga anatisiya ndili wamng’ono, biznesis yogulitsa nkhu ni yakhala ikundithandiza kusamalira abale anga, poti ndinali woyamba kubadwa (DNI)”*

*My parents died when we were young this business of selling firewood helped me to take care of my siblings as I was the firstborn in the family” (DNI)*

This study has gathered that people who pay for tickets in withdrawing timber from the forest of both Dedza and Zomba are motivated to continue with their business because it does not need much money for one to start. The demand for wood fuel as the affordable energy used for cooking in both Dedza town and Zomba city has made the business of firewood to be one of the profit-making businesses. With respect to rational choice institutionalism (Peters, 2019), most of these stakeholders find more benefits in adhering to the rules of withdrawing forest resources. They know that violating these rules will stop them from deriving the benefits they could have

realised in their business concerning these resources. This is the case because the Malawi forest policy and act provide an environment where the stakeholders' interest are realised in adhering to these rules. With respect to Peters (2019), the forest policy, in this case, is a good institution, the argument being that they serve the interest of some of its stakeholders.

On the part of charcoal sellers from both Dedza and Zomba forest reserve, it was learnt from the charcoal sellers that the Malawi forest act and policy, make it difficult for them to produce, transport and sell charcoal. This meant that the Malawi Forest Policy and the Act did not incorporate the interest of the people involved in the charcoal business in both Dedza and Zomba. With respect to Guy Peter's (2019) arguments, the forest institutions ought to incorporate the interest of the stakeholders involved in the charcoal business. The people involved in the charcoal business do not derive any benefit from abiding by the rules of the Malawi Forest Policy and Act with respect to their interest. These people rely on the charcoal business to take care of themselves and their families, and they believe that they can only achieve this in the business of charcoal. For these people, it is rational for them to violate these rules for them to achieve their desired goals than to abide by them because they gain more than the cost in this business (Howlet et al, 2013).

Looking from another angle of the same institutions, Peters (2019), argued that institutions are deliberately created to serve certain interests. These interests can be of few or more individuals within a community if they are common-pool resources, and they can also be the state's interest (Wendell, 2004). Mutimba and Kamoto (2017), argued that these institutions were rationally created deliberately to serve the interest of the state of conserving forests in Malawi than the interests of a small group of

people. As a result of this, the state ignored the interest of the people involved in the charcoal business for the greater good of the greater nation of Malawi.

In an area of cooperative agreements made between Dedza and Zomba forest department and the established cooperatives, according to Peters (2019) arguments, this study found out that the forest institutions offer similar opportunities to both the cooperatives in these forests, the only difference is that the cooperatives in Zomba benefit more than their counterparts in Dedza. According to one of the cooperatives members (ZC1), the institutional arrangement that is there between the forest department of Zomba and the forest cooperatives, allows the cooperatives to derive more benefits than cost by implementing and abiding by the rules with regard to plantations, protection and management of trees in the Zomba mountain forest (Peters, 2019). These institutional incentives have propelled the cooperatives in Zomba in taking an active role in the management and the conservation of Zomba mountain forest than Dedza. These cooperatives are encouraged because there is a guarantee that there are more trees and that there will be trees even in a couple of years to come that are going to be allocated to them to harvest.

In addition to this, ZC1 also disclosed that there are only a few cooperatives which means that there are fewer players in the harvesting of trees, and the less the number of players, the more the benefits they are going to get in their business and vice-versa. This concurs with Wendell's study (2004), that it is easy to manage a few numbers of players in the management of common resources, as it is easy for them to realise the benefits when abiding by the institutions that govern their interaction in the withdrawal of these resources (Peters, 2019). The profits that cooperatives in Zomba realise encourage them to continue investing in the conservation and management of

the forest resources. The cooperatives' interest makes them abide by the institutions governing forest resources, knowing very well that their counterparts, that is the forest department will fulfil their obligations (North, 1991), of rewarding them by being allowed to harvest the trees for timber processing and selling.

On the other hand, DF1 disclosed that the institutional arrangement between the forest department and the cooperatives in Dedza does not and did not offer many incentives to the cooperative which was formed as compared to the cooperatives in Zomba, with respect to the available forest trees in Dedza mountain forest plantation. According to Anderson (2006), incentives come in as a result of expected returns or benefits that actors governed by certain institutions expect to get as rewards for abiding by these institutions (Peters, 2006). The cooperative in Dedza was formed on the assumption that, there is enough trees in the forest which would enable them to start realising the benefits in the short term. According to Anderson (2006) and Zhang and Peake (2013), the cooperative was motivated by the assumption that there could be the perpetual realisation of the profits in their business with the forest resources from Dedza mountain forest plantation while managing it. The DF1 explained that the cooperative in Dedza was formed a little late because most of the trees had already been depleted. As a result of this, the cooperative was not willing to invest in a business that will enable them to realise the short term profits, and that they had to continue investing and wait for 15 to 20 years before they start again realising other profits. The cost of abiding by this institutional arrangement was high than the benefits. This means that there were fewer incentives that could make them abide by the rules. It was difficult for the institutions to be successful because there were no incentives for these players.



#### ***4.2.2. The Interest of the police department in Dedza and Zomba mountain forests***

From the police department in Dedza and Zomba, the study found out that their interests are to help the forest department to enforce rules, with regard to the Act that guides the forestry department. For example, Dedza police officer (DP1) explained that:

*“mwachitsanzo, timayitanidwa kukathandiza kulanda makala, komanso anthu onyamula magalimoto mu nsewu wa khwekhwelere, amatipatsa allowance komanso kuthandiza kugwira anthu odula komanso kunyamula mitengo mosatsata malamulo”.*

*“Like for example if we go for an exercise to catch people who transport charcoal along the Khwekhwelere road, we are given allowances by the department of forest, or we go catch people who are cutting and transporting forest trees illegally, we are also given monetary allowances”*

It was learnt from the DP1 that the police officers in Dedza do not take an initiative in enforcing the forest rules than their counterparts in Zomba as they only rely upon being called or invited to join in the exercises initiated by the forestry department. Lack of initiative by the police from Dedza in taking an active role in the protection and the enforcement of the Forest institutions contradicts what is stated in the Malawi Forest Act of 1997 section 9 (Government of Malawi) which states that

***9.- (1) Any officer or police officer may seize and detain forest produce and article***

*(a) any forest produce which the officer or police officer reasonably suspects has been obtained or removed in contravention of this Act;*

*(2) Any officer or police officer who seizes and detains any forest produce or article under subsection (1) shall issue a seizure certificate.*

In an ideal scenario, the police are expected to work hand in hand with the forest officer to make sure that the forest is protected according to what the 1997 Act stipulates. The alternative explanation to their behaviour was given by Anderson (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013), that these police officers are demotivated not to commit themselves to the protection and management of forest resources because of lack of these incentives, like the monetary allowances. The argument here is that if there were incentives involved to attract them, they would be at the forefront in executing their duties according to the act of forest in Dedza, even if the act was silent. Despite the lack of incentives, the police officers from Zomba demonstrated that it is not only incentives as defined by Anderson (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013), but the satisfaction that they derive if they successfully do their duties that influences their dedication to the conservation of trees in the forest of Zomba.

Both Dedza and Zomba police officers, agree that incentives are there but limited. These incentives included monetary allowances, and transport for them to use in their work of enforcing these forests formal rules. Fewer incentives that are there for the police officers in both the police department of Dedza and Zomba have brought different results with respect to their interest in the management of forest resources in these districts. It was learnt from ZP1 that the police officers in Zomba are not only motivated by monetary incentives, but rather by the belief of being the only law enforcers responsible in helping in the protection and enforcement of forest

institutions. This is different from the assumption made by Anderson (2006), Zhang Peake that power, the desire to win political positions and monetary incentives motivate stakeholders in forests resources.

#### ***4.2.3. The interest of Dedza and Zomba Local District Council in Dedza mountain forests resources***

This study found that the local councils of Dedza and Zomba's interests' is to make sure that all projects taking place in Dedza don't pose any threat to the environment which include trees in the forest of Dedza and Zomba mountain. ZDC1 stated that this includes protecting, conserving and promoting the sustainable use of natural forests. In addition to this ZDC1 added that the Zomba District Council plays a role in teaching the people how to protect the trees in the forest of Zomba.

In terms of incentives, it was learnt that there are no monetary incentives for councils of Dedza, Zomba. This lack of monetary incentives is different to what Kayambazinthu (2000) observed in his study, that during the 1920s the local councils in Malawi used to dedicate their work to forest management because they benefited from the revenue collected in the management of forest resources. According to Kayambazinthu's (ibid) study, the local council cannot dedicate themselves to the work of conserving forests if there are no incentives for them. This is the defect of the forest institutions as they are supposed to incorporate the interests of various stakeholders as argued by Peters (2019). In their study, Rozemeijer and Van de Jagt (2000), argued that institutions that accommodate the interests of all stakeholders are the key to successful conservation and management of forests. The logical result of

this lack of incentives could negatively affect their dedication to forest resource management as argued by Andersen (2006).

The Dedza District Council officer (DDC1) confessed that the lack of these monetary incentives has made them invest more of their time in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) projects, for organizations like United for Purpose (UP) and World Vision International, because they are offered more monetary allowances. This confirms the argument presented by Andersen (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013), that incentives play a part in influencing the officers in the conservation of forest resources. The Dedza district council officer disclosed that they concentrate much on NGOs projects because there are more allowances accrued to them when they are working with these organizations.

On the other hand, it was puzzling to find out from the ZDC1 and ZCC1 that lack of these incentives has not affected the work of the officers at Zomba district and City councils in their involvement of helping the Forest Department in the protection of forest resources, as argued by Andersen (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013). An explanation was that they are satisfied when they successfully execute their roles as environmental officers working in the councils of Zomba.

This study confirms the conflict of interest that is there between the Forest department and the local councils as established by Kambewa et al (2007). Kambewa et al (2007) noted that most of the local councils in Malawi continue to collect the market fees from charcoal sellers despite being unlicensed. The department of forestry and local Councils are two statutory entities, which operates under two different policies, the “Decentralization policy” and the “Forest policy”. It is argued that the policies that

have an impact on forest conservation were harmonised according to the 2016 forest Policy (Government of Malawi, 2016). However, it has been established by this study from DDC1, ZDC1 and ZCC that the local councils source their funds through the collection of market fees in their markets. Chiweza (cited in Patel and Svasand, 2013) noted that most local councils do not collect enough revenue from their sources to finance their expenditure, as a result of this, it is rational for these local councils to continue collecting market fees from charcoal sellers as observed by Kambewa et al (2007), because stopping the collection of revenue from charcoal sellers would lower their revenue. This means that the local councils do not derive any utility by fully implementing the forest policy (Howlet et al, 2013) as a result of this they choose to manipulate the rules so that they serve their interests as pointed out by clever and De Koning (2015). The working rules for the local councils of Dedza and Zomba allow the selling of charcoal without licences in their markets to boost up their revenue collection (Ostrom, 1990).

#### *4.2.3.1. The interests of Dedza and Zomba traditional leaders in mountain forest resources*

On the part of traditional leaders living close to Dedza and Zomba mountain forest reserves, the researcher discovered from DT1 and ZT1 that they partly help in the protection and management of forests, and there is a lack of incentives to motivate them. According to them these incentives could include ,monetary incentives, having power to control on how the forests resources should be managed and being allocated benefits of the proceeds from the sales of forest resources by the forest department. This is different from what Peters (2019) proposed that rational institutionalism ought to accommodate the interest of all stakeholders for easy implementation of forest

institutions including traditional leaders, while constraining their behaviour. Mauambeta (2010) noted that traditional leaders were helpful in the management of VFAs in the 1920s and 1930s, due to the incentives that were accrued to them. Maumbeta's argument concurs with the argument raised by Anderson (2006), that incentives play a role in motivating stakeholders to play an active role in conserving forest resources.

The traditional leaders, whose jurisdiction is close to the forest reserves areas of Zomba and Dedza mountain forests are key players in the conservation of forests close to their areas. As such these leaders need incentives for them to dedicate themselves and work in the conservation of forest. In the policy statement of the forest policy (Malawi Forest Policy, 2016), the forest policy statement clearly states that

*“The policy will ensure that local communities are provided with appropriate incentives to manage forest resources based on clear mechanisms of ownership and control” (Malawi Forest Policy, p. 15)*

The study found that there are no incentives for these local leaders, despite that provision, yet these leaders play a critical role in making sure that their subjects are using the forests responsibly and they are helping in the protection of forests. This has made the local traditional leaders in both these districts not have any interest in the conservation of forest resources as argued by Anderson (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013). Lack of these incentives has made the traditional leaders not to take an active role in the protection and conservation of forests in their areas.

#### **4.2.4. The interest of Dedza and Zomba Forest Officers**

The forest officers from Dedza and Zomba Forest Department were clear on their role and interest with regard to the forest. DF1 disclosed to the researcher that they are there to manage forests, protect and conserve. This includes making sure that all forest activities are done on time as stipulated on their calendar of activities. These activities include preparing nursery beds for trees, sowing, putting trees into tubes, planting the trees, clearing the land for the land where these trees are going to be transplanted, making fire breaks and clearing bush inside the forest. In addition to this, they also sensitise people living close to the forests on forest conservation.

The ZF1 study found out that one of the interests of the forest department is to manage forests, communities do manage their forests. One of the respondents said,

*“It’s not only about planting trees and managing them, but why do you need to plant certain kinds of trees, for example, what it takes to grow Pines, which areas are favourable which includes the weather, how best do we harvest these trees. So, this kind of responsibility cannot fall in the hands of just ordinary citizens”*  
(ZF1).

This shows that the forest department plays a very important role in the conservation of forests, above all other stakeholders. For them to achieve this goal it needs staff that are well qualified and motivated to do the work. For this to work they need good working conditions, personal protective gears, and to be promoted, For example, as narrated by DF2

*“Mwachitsanzo mwina munthu ndiwe wothilira kaya guard koma waonetsa luso loti utha kumafesa njere za mitengo bwinobwino, komanso kusamalira mbande, mbuyomu amakukweza pantchito koma pano ayi” (DF2).*

*for example ,if you are responsible for watering seedlings or you are a forest guard and you also have good skills in sowing taking good care of the same seedlings, in the past, you could be promoted” (DF2).*

In addition to this, they also need good allowance and adequate staff to manage the workload they have in the departments, these are the incentives that motivate them to work effectively and efficiently in their course of conserving forest resources as argued by Anderson (2006) and Zhang and Peake (2013). This study has established that the forest department of the Dedza Zomba forest reserve lacks these incentives. The lack of these mentioned incentives may lead to dysfunction of the forest policy and Act because for institutions to work there has to be incentives for individuals within the organization that will abide by the institutions knowing that they will derive more satisfaction within these institutions than working outside or against them (Peters, 2019).

#### **4.3. Effects of stakeholder’ interest on forest resources of Dedza and Zomba mountain forests**

This section presents the findings and discussion on the second objective of this study that is, the effects of stakeholder’s interest in forest resources from both Dedza and Zomba mountain forest reserves. The discussion of the effects of the stakeholder’



interest on forests resource revolves around the analysis of how their actions affect forest resources when they are trying to maximise their benefits at a lower cost in the management of forest resources.

#### ***4.3.1. Effects of stakeholders' interests involved in the timber and charcoal business***

The interests of people involved in the business of timber in Dedza and Zomba mountain forest reserve have brought both negative positive effects on the conservation of forests. Firstly, this study found out respondents in Dedza and Zomba that the interest of people involved in the business of timber has helped in terms of revenue collection for the forest department. The more people go to collect timber for sale and pay for either simple receipt or general receipt, the more revenue the forest department collects. The study has found that the interest of people who are involved in the timber business has made some of them abide by the rules. According to the theory of rational choice institutionalism, good institutions control and constrain the behaviours of the stakeholders of that institution (Peters, 2019), The forest formal institutions have managed to tame the behaviour of some stakeholders to abide by the laws knowing that their behaviour will be rewarded by being allowed to use the forest resources. This has helped in the conservation of forests in Dedza and Zomba mountain forest reserves, as this ensures that the right resources are withdrawn from the forests and that the forest department collects revenue which would help in the management of forests.

However, despite the positive effects of these institutions, their negative side is that they have failed to help encourage these stakeholders to take an active role in the conservation of forests. There are no incentives attached to these people in the

conservation of trees. The forest institutions do not encourage them to directly involve themselves in the conservation, because it does not instil in them the spirit of ownership (Wendell, 2004). It does this in three ways. Firstly, these people are not directly involved in the management of forests. Secondly, they don't invest much in forest resources like the cooperatives, apart from paying for receipts. Lastly, forests are taken as open access resources to all (ibid). This means that there are many players involved in the withdrawal of the resources. It becomes difficult for them to engage themselves in conserving the forests, and it also becomes difficult to control these players. As a result of this, they are only interested in getting the resources or else their fellow players will get it as the resources are scarce. As a result of this it becomes difficult to control such individuals (Wong, 2004). This study concurs with Umazi et al (2016), that effective and successful conservation of forest resources involves the coming together of all stakeholders and harmonising their interest. The argument is that all stakeholders should feel that they are part of the management team.

The demand for fuel from firewood has tempted most stakeholders to violate these rules, as some go to harvest trees illegally during the night, knowing that the forest guards will not be there to make more profits resulting in more deforestation and forest degradation... DSN8 confessed that

*“Ndine wa manyazi, chifukwa khalidwe langa lokuba mitengo usiku laononga za nkhlango ya m’phiri la Dedza”. (DSN8)*

*“I am now ashamed of my acts of stealing trees because these contributed to the degradation of trees in the forests through our legal harvesting of the trees in Dedza mountain” (DSN8).*

In addition to these, it was also learnt from DSN9 that some people could deliberately set fire in the forest in areas with immature trees so that the forest department should declare that these trees should be cleared out, and people should have an opportunity to harvest these trees. This shows that Forest institutions have failed to shape the behaviours of some actors who are involved in the illegal withdraw of timber from the forest, as they ought to do. The argument here is that a good institution is supposed to shape the behaviour of all involved in it as argued by Peters (2019). However, this study has noted that some of the interest of the stakeholders are not realised through the formal forest institutions as a result, these stakeholders find other means to play around the forest formal institutions in maximising these interest (Cleaver and De Koning, 2015) by cutting trees illegally, and even harvesting immature trees. This means that these people feel dissatisfied because they do not benefit the most from the forests, hence setting the fire. These acts are more common in Dedza than in Zomba mountain forests and have led to the depletion of trees in the Dedza mountain forest as noted by Mauambeta (2010).

Another group related to the latter is illegal charcoal sellers. This study has learnt from charcoal sellers in Dedza and Zomba that to them, the cost of producing charcoal illegally is low than the cost of producing charcoal legally. The high demand for charcoal fuel in urban areas as found by Kambewa et al (2007), Zulu (2010) and Maumabeta (2010), has contributed to the unsustainable production of charcoal and negatively affected the forest resources (Mutimba and Kamoto, 2017). Lack of incentives in the forestry institutions to compel them to abide by these laws as argued by Anderson (2006), has also contributed to this problem. This in turn has negatively affected the conservation of forests.

On cooperatives, this study has gathered that the cooperative in the Zomba mountain forest reserve are helping in conserving and management of the forest resources, and this has helped to restore the trees in some of the parts of the Zomba mountain. As the respondent put it,

*“Tadzala mitengo yambiri ma hectares angapo ndithu,  
tabwezeretsa mitengo muphiri la Zombali kusiyana ndi m’buyomu”*

*(ZC1)*

*“ We have planted a lot of trees covering many hectares in th  
Zomba mountain forest reserve, comparing to the trees planted by  
the forest department in the previous years” (ZC1)*

This finding too, concurs with the studies by Anderson (2006), Zhang and Peake(2013), that incentives play a role in the conservation of forest resources. The cooperatives in Zomba have helped in the conservation of forests due to the rewards they get in abiding by the rules than operating outside these institutions (Peters, 2019). They view the forest of Zomba as their own, and that they will have long-run reaping of profits from their investments. On the other hand, the interest of the cooperatives in Dedza has not helped in any way. The cooperative in Dedza is of the view that the cost of managing part of the forest is costly, than that of withdrawing the remaining trees in the forest. For example, the DF1 explained that the cooperative was once asked to plant trees in an area covering 30 hectare but they refused, yet they did not refuse to turn down the offer of the area they were given to harvest, and they exploited the trees to their advantage. What the cooperative in Dedza did confirms what Larson and Ribot (2007) argued that other forest stakeholders exploit forest

resources for their selfish benefits. The cooperative in Dedza was disbanded after finishing the trees which they were allocated, without re-planting.

#### ***4.3.2. The effects of the interests of Police officers on Dedza and Zomba mountain forest resources***

On the part of police officers from Dedza and Zomba, this study found from DP1, that their passive role in the protection of forest resources has affected the protection of forests negatively in Dedza. The officers in Dedza only wait to be called. Even at road-blocks it is left to the forest officer to inspect the vehicle if they are carrying charcoal or unauthorised forest resources. If the forest officer is not there that means these vehicles are allowed to pass. The study agrees with Anderson (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013), that the Dedza police department does not take an active role in the conservation and the protection of forest resources. This is the case despite the Forest Act clearly stating the role of police officers in enforcing forest institutions. The police officers have not been motivated to take this active role. This has also led other police officers to be involved in corrupt activities such as taking bribes with respect to forest resources, in both district of Dedza and Zomba.

On the other hand, this study has established from ZP1, that the Police in Zomba have tried to help conserve and preserve trees in the Zomba mountain forests, due to their active role in the protection of forests resources. The Zomba police department has slightly been affected by the lack of incentives been incorporated in the forest institutions. This study is of the view that if there were some incentives for the police department apart from fulfilling their roles according to the laws of Malawi and the forest act, it could have greatly contributed positively to their work in conserving

forest resources as it has been established by Anderson (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013).

#### *4.3.2.1. The Effects of the Dedza, and Zomba district Councils on forest resources*

This study has established from DDC1 the local council officers from Dedza focus much on the projects brought by the NGOs over those of the forest department, because of monetary allowances. This confirms the arguments by Peters (2019), that institutions work well when stakeholders realise their interest within these institutions. These officers choose to work with Non-governmental organizations which may not always have the same interest in the conservation of forests as the forests department. Kayambazinthu (2000) noted that the NGOs have their interest in the management of forest which may not always translate into the conservation of forests in Dedza. One may conclude then, that one of the reasons the Forestry Department is failing to protect the trees in the Dedza Mountain forest, is because some of the stakeholders are not playing their role.

This study has also discovered from ZDC1 and ZCC1 that the Zomba District and City councils are trying to help in the conservation, the forest resources with respect to their interest. Lack of incentives has not negatively affected the local councils in Zomba in their work to conserve forests as argued by Anderson (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013) than the Dedza district council. their dedication is based on implementing the institution not based on monetary incentives. This paper maintains its view that the presence of some incentives to motivate the local authorities of

Dedza, Zomba city and Zomba district could have positively contributed to the already good work being done by both councils as pointed out by Anderson (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013). This argument is being based on the study conducted by Mauambeta (2010), that the incentives helped the local councils to positively contribute to the conservation of forests in Malawi during the 1920s and 1930s. This study is of the view that these incentives can still make a difference in conserving forest today.

#### *4.3.2.2. The effects of the interest of Dedza and Zomba traditional leaders on Dedza mountain forest resources*

The researcher learnt from the traditional leaders in both Dedza and Zomba that they are partly involved in the management and protection of trees in the mountain of Dedza. They don't want to be at the forefront, because of a lack of incentives. This has negatively affected the conservation of trees in the forest of Dedza as the leaders just watch people stealing firewood and even cutting down trees illegally. It was learnt from both these leaders that they act as spectators in the protection and conservation of forests. For example, ZT1 explained that

*“Timagoona mitengo ikamabedwa, chifukwa palibepo chathu”*

*“We just watch, when trees are being stolen in the mountain,  
because there is nothing that is concern us”*

This is different from what Kayambazinthu (2000) acknowledged, about traditional leaders during colonial rule where they helped in conserving forests in Malawi with incentives attached as presented by Anderson (2006) Zhang and Pekae (2013). This

study is of the view that traditional leaders can put in place mechanisms and systems that can make sure that trees are not depleted by those who withdraw forest resources illegally, including those burning charcoal. Traditional leaders know their area very well, their people and even the means and the ways which the people who harvest and transport forest resources illegally use. Unlike the council and police officers in Zomba, who at least have resources to help them in their course of helping the forest officers in the conservation of forests, traditional leaders need resources, and there are some sacrifices they can make in this course, for them to make such sacrifices they need incentives. The argument here is that they are nothing that they benefit from the forests due to the current forest institutions

#### ***4.3.3. Effects of Dedza Forest officers interests on forest resources***

This study has found out that the forest officers from both Dedza and Zomba are doing their best to make sure that they conserve the present trees and those that are planted. This study has discovered that the lack of motivation that is there in the forest department in Dedza and Zomba has affected the delivery of their services on time because of lack of funding. This has made the forest officers start losing interest in their work, which has affected the conservation of forest resources in Dedza and Zomba. Non-provision of incentives for forest officers within it as argued by Peters (2019), has negatively affected the conservation of forests in both Dedza and Zomba mountain forests. In the forest department, the lack of incentives as argued by Anderson (2006), Zhang and Peake (2013) for the forest workers is one of the challenges that have to be dealt with, if not, just like cancer it is going to spread and continue to affect the forest sector negatively which will consequently lead to



degradation of forests in Malawi. Most of the forest officers are demotivated, as explained by DF2 that,

*“Nde amati ife tinayamba ntchito kalekele koma malipiro ndi omwe aja, zaka zadutsa 30 koma malipiro ndi omwe aja”.*

*They say we started this work a long time ago, now it has been over 30 years the salary is the same but no promotion.*

In addition to the above arguments, lack of incentives within the formal institutions to contain the actors within that organizations in respecting its institutions gives way to informal institutions, which offer the incentives of abiding by its rules of the actors involved (Helmekr and Levitsky, 2004). This means the forest officers may be tempted to earn these rewards informally, by playing by the informal rules. That is why Zulu (2010) and Kambewa et al (2007) found that there is corruption in the forest department. This explains why forest officers receive bribes when they meet people transporting charcoal and timber illegally.

#### **4.4. The effectiveness of Malawi forest institutions**

This section presents the findings and the discussion on the third objective of this study on the effectiveness of forests institutions which include both formal and informal institutions in the management of forests. The discussion involves an analysis of how formal and informal institutions are effective in getting things done in achieving the desired end. This discussion will also include the interaction of formal and informal institutions.

#### ***4.4.1. The people involved in the timber and charcoal business's views on the effectiveness of forest institutions in Dedza and Zomba***

This study asked the respondents involved in the timber and charcoal business in Dedza and Zomba whether they follow the forest formal rules. It was learnt from them that some of the people in Dedza and Zomba do follow the forest formal rules while few do not. The respondents stated that some of the rules include paying for the receipt before withdrawing timber from the forest. They explained that people going into forests to collect woods, branches of trees or dry logs for personal use and selling are asked to pay K50 for the receipt. People with vehicles are asked to pay for general receipt popularly known as GR. These respondents also shared the same knowledge that only matured trees are qualified for harvesting. According to rational choice institutionalism by Peters (2019, p. 77), it is argued that *“a good institution is the one that performs the assigned task well and efficiently”*. In other words, good institutions are the ones that can achieve the desired goals. Forestry policy and Act have less successful stories and more failures in both Dedza and Zomba mountain forest plantations. The Forest Institutions should be recommended for trying to stop other stakeholders from violating them. Some of the stakeholders involved in the withdrawal of forest resources see it rational to abide by the rules than to violate them. According to Peters' (2019) argument on good institutions, forest institutions have been good and effective. The people involved in the timber and charcoal business know that their interest can only be achieved by being a member and abiding by these institutions than not being attached to these institutions.

The researcher also found from DN5 that those that are caught collecting firewood without tickets are taken to the police, while some had their bicycles, and ox-carts,

others their pangs, taken away from them or forced to plant trees more trees. The institutions have also partly managed to punish some actors who have tried violating the rules. For example, these include those caught cutting down forest trees or transporting trees illegally, and forest guards who are caught taking bribes as explained by DN6. This concurs with North's (1991) arguments that institutions are characterised by rewarding those who abide by them and punishing those who default. Good institutions according to Peters' (2019) rational choice institutionalism, do try to make the cost of violating these rules high than the benefits of violating them. This helps to make rational beings find it beneficial to always respect these institutions with the belief that their interest can always be realised within these institutions as argued by Peters (2019). For example, the cooperatives in Zomba have always been respecting the agreements of their institutional arrangement knowing that their goals will only be realised within these institutions. As a result of this they continued to enjoy the benefits they realise in the management of these forest resources.

Despite having such rules, it was also pointed out by respondent DN6 that,

*“Ena amanyengana ndi ma forest guard kuti adule nkhuni mwachinyengo, ena amapeleka ma diza akagwidwa atalakwa, ena amauzidwa kuti akakugwirani zanu. Nthawi zina amalandira ndalama ndikuwauza anthu amene akupeleka ndalamawo kuti akagwidwa ndi zawo”*

*Some female firewood sleep with forest guards for them to be allowed to cut down trees or collect timber illegally, some bribe the forest guard, but they are told that if they are caught they should not involve them. Some forest officers receive bribes and tell the*

*people who pay the money that, if they get caught it will be none of their business”*

In addition to this people go to the forest during night hours when they know that the forest guards are not there to harvest immature trees and forbidden trees. These people do have their machines which they use to harvest these trees. As one of the respondents stated that

*“Ndimapita kukadula usiku kwambiri chifukwa ndimadziwa kuti a Forestry sapezekako” (DSN8)*

*“I go to steal trees in the forest during the night because I know that forest officers will not be around”*

The respondents DSN9 informed the researcher that these rules are ineffective as they fail to deter some stakeholders and people, from violating them. DSN9 explained that people could pay for the general receipt for the quantity of one ton of timber, but they could cut trees for two tons, or even five tons. Formal rules are weak, as people don't fear them as they used to do in the past. The forest department must make sure that the trees are replanted after being harvested but this was not happening. Trees are not taken care of.

This study has also discovered that there are few forest guards to enforce the rules and watch over the forest and protect it. What this study gathered from the timber and charcoal sellers in Dedza is that during Kamuzu's time these rules were properly enforced but now they are not respected by the forest users. The weakness of the formal forest rules is that they have failed to deal with illegal timber harvesters, traffickers and charcoal sellers and transporters, as a result, it has opened a way for

bribery as their informal rules, which has succeeded in shaping the behaviour of stakeholders involved. On illegal timber harvesting and trafficking, this study agrees with what Mauambeta (2010) found that in the forest like Chongoni Pine forest, trees were cut illegally with grossly low enforcement by authorities.

It should be added that these findings concur with the studies by Chakravarty et al, (2012) and Le Bellion (2002), the only difference that this study has found is that there is not only low authority enforcement but that the people involved in these illegal activities know the weaknesses in the existing institutions and have capitalised on them to satisfy their appetites of withdrawing the timber using means outside the established formal forest institutions (Leftwich, 2007). For example, they go and harvest trees during the night knowing that no forest guards will be there to stop them. In addition to this, these people have taken advantage of fewer forest guards to mark the areas where are less likely to be guarded at particular times of the day.

In addition to the above findings, respondents stated that the rules about planting, caring and protecting trees are ineffective because there are inadequate officers to carry out the task. The respondents believe that taking care of trees is a problem as most forest guards and labourers retired. In addition to this, respondent ZN3 mentioned that in Zomba mountain forest reserve there only two rangers patrolling the whole Zomba mountain forest reserve, to make sure that people are not collecting, cutting and transporting trees from the forest illegally.

For the people involved in the charcoal business, it was learnt from respondent DC1 that they know that burning, selling and transportation of charcoal from Malawi is against the law and that it is for that reason that they take their charcoal from Mozambique. The respondent informed the researcher that when they meet police

officers, they just give them money. The respondent also disclosed that the Dedza district council does collect the revenue as usual and they don't ask them if they have licence or Confiscate their charcoal if they don't have. This encourages them to continue with their business. This study has established that enforcing the rules on burning charcoal has been a problem for both forest and police officers in Dedza and Zomba Mountain forest. CZC3 stated that at first, the forest used to work with traditional leaders and other village committees to make sure that that charcoal was not produced. Charcoal producers used to fear them until they retired and committees were disbanded. Currently, this study has found that charcoal producers do not allow the police and forest officers to come close to the areas where it is produced to stop them because they are powerless to enforce the rules. As a result of this, the police and the forest officers do not bother to reach these places. The establishment of these informal rules which forbids forest officers and police officers from approaching the places where charcoal is produced in Chingale and Phalombe shows the weaknesses of the formal forest laws (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). These informal rules are now the operational rules (Ostrom, 1990) that are followed by both the forest officers and the police department. These informal rules do attract both rewards for those who respect them and punishments for those who violate them as explained by North (1991). Those forest and police officers who violate these operational rules are punished by being beaten or have stones thrown at them.

This study also discovered that when transporting the charcoal, sometimes it is taken away from them along the way to the market by the police and the forest officers together with their mobile phones and bicycles. And they have to pay at the police station to redeem them. The respondents admitted to being given money to police and forest officers as bribes, to let them pass, this observation concurs with the study by

Kambewa et al (2007), Yaron et al (2011) and Zulu (2010) that informal rules like corruption and bribery are working within, around, and among formal forest rules. This informal institution competes with formal rules because of its weakness (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). These lawbreakers do bribe forest and the police officers of both Dedza and Zomba so that they conduct their illegal actions smoothly as observed by Kambewa et al (2007). The argument here is that the formal institutions do not serve the interest of these charcoal sellers and producers as argued by Peters (2019). These people go for alternative institutions which could allow them to realise their interest by deriving satisfaction, and these are informal institutions that become their working rules (Ostrom, 1990). Bribery becomes the working rule which determines and directs the behaviour of the charcoal sellers and transporters (Ostrom, 1990). This confirms the findings by Kambewa et al (2007), Yaron et al (2011) and Zulu (2010), that corruption exists among some stakeholders in the management of forest resources.

This study has found out from ZC1 that first, the government had the power to decide on how to manage the tree in the forest of Zomba. The institutions changed and the management of trees was moved from the government to the people. The cooperatives came in and took the responsibility of the trees (managing), the task which the government failed to perform. This involves sowing, transplanting and taking care of trees. The members are required to pay money for tree management activities. As a way of rewarding these cooperatives, they are the ones considered to harvest trees in the Zomba mountain forest. The institutional arrangement on cooperatives in Dedza has not been a success in Dedza as it is in Zomba. The DF1 explained that the cooperatives were established, they started well but things did not work as expected because it was costly for cooperative to manage trees, in an area where there are is the uncertainty of getting high future returns. This was so because

the forest of Dedza has few trees left, which do not promise much to the members. They were once asked to plant 30 hectares of land but they refused that they can't manage. The DF1 explained that

*“Anthuwa analibe ndalama zokwanira zosamalira mitengo ena mwa iwo anali atakongolandalama ku FINCA, nde analibe chiyembekezo kuti kodi akapitiliza ngongole akabweza bwanji”*

*“These people did not have the money to manage tree., Some of them got loans from FINCA, so they did not have any hope that this business will work for them”*

According to Peters (2019) argument, the forest officers failed to enforce the rules on making sure that the cooperative in Dedza respected the contractual agreement with them, making the forest laws to be ineffective. The cooperative in Dedza saw the weaknesses with these established rules and played around them to achieve their desired outcomes, as argued by Cleaver and De Koning (2015).

The other institutions that this study learnt from ZC1, are barriers for one to join the cooperative, due to the limited quantity of trees in the Zomba mountain forests. This is the case because the cooperative members are mindful of making sure that they still have to cover the cost of managing the trees while still making profits. To do that the number of members of the cooperative must be as small and manageable as possible. From what ZC1 explained, this study has deduced that the forest department and the cooperatives themselves have the discretion of deciding on who will have access to entry in these cooperatives or not. Restrictive rules are established to allow a few numbers of players to join and create a barrier to entry on the other hand for other



players. This kind of arrangement creates winners and losers (Howlett et al, 2013). Winners, in this case, are the ones who are allowed to join the cooperatives and losers are the ones who are left out. The losers find other means of making sure that they too extract trees in the Zomba mountain forest, only that they use illegal means of achieving their interests.

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#### ***4.4.2. The views of Dedza Police officers on the effectiveness of forest institutions***

This study found similar views from the respondents DP1 and ZP1 of the police department of both Dedza and Zomba districts respectively: that forest institutions are good but they are not effective in achieving the intentions that they were made for. They both gave an example of these rules as being statutory, as such the one who breaks them is charged with a statutory offence and not a criminal offence. Some of the punishments for these statutory offences include paying fines, and it also attracts light punishments. As such they do not deter people from violating these offences. Those that are caught are asked to pay fines or serve their sentences. According to Peters (2019), if the forest institutions fail to achieve their purpose by deterring people from violating the rules, then they are not good. In this case, the forest formal institutions have failed to achieve the desired goals, by failing to deter other people from violating them because of light punishments. The findings from the two police departments of Dedza and Zomba are in line with what Yaron et al (2011), Mutimba and Kamoto (2017) stated in their papers, that there is an inadequate enabling policy which has proved itself to be ineffective. In addition to this, this paper agrees with the

Yaron et al (2011) that current formal forest institutions encourage the illegal withdrawal of forest resources.

The DP1, also stated that enforcing the rules of illegal selling of charcoal in Dedza market, is always futile, because the forest department and the police are afraid to do the exercise as they tried once, and the police officer narrated the experience as being frightening,

*“Anthu anthu onse anatiukira kufuna kuyamba kumenyana nafe  
kufuna kutigenda, ndiye tinangobwerera”*

*“People in the market ganged against us, and they wanted to beat  
and throw stones at us we simply returned”*

Political interference was another similar problem mentioned by both DP1 and ZP1 as influencing the efficiency and effectiveness of the rules. It was disclosed by DP1 during the interview that when a truck or lorry is caught on the police roadblock carrying trees logs without necessary papers, the driver sometimes calls the senior forest officers in the headquarters who in turn advise the forest officers on the roadblock to allow the vehicle pass on the roadblock. In addition to this, the DP1 also blamed the forest department of Dedza for being ineffective. The main argument raised by the respondent was that the forestry department being negligent in monitoring forest areas that are being encroached.

On the other hand, the politicians have been intervening in the work of the police officers, which has led to the ineffective enforcement of forest laws on the part of the police officers. The ZP1 officer further revealed that politicians connected to the

previous governments were intervening in their work, by tampering with the evidence. For example

*“Mwachitsanzo tinagwira galimoto ya Makala, koma tinakakamizidwa ndi mkulu wa ku chipani cha DPP yemwe anali ndi udindo waukulu m'boma, anandiyimbira phone kuti tiilie galimotoyo kuti idzipita, ndiye sitinakachitira mwina, koma kuyisiya chifukwa inali lamulo lochokera kwa akuluakulu. Nkhani yofanana ndi yomweyi inachitika ku Lilongwe komwe ndimagwira ntchito, tinagwiranso galimoto 10 ton itanyamula mitengo ya mtsanya, akuluakulu a DPP omwe anali m'boma anatiyimbira phone kuti tiyisiye ipite”*

*“ For example, the vehicle carrying charcoal was once caught by us the police but we were instructed by senior DPP officials who held a prominent government position to release the vehicle because it was an order from above, I could not do otherwise but to let it go. A similar instance to this one happened when I was working Lilongwe, we caught a vehicle carrying 10-ton logs of Mstanya tree was caught, some DPP guys called in to let the vehicle go”*

This study found out that the intervention of political leaders to achieve their private self-interest as noted by Zulu (2010) has negatively affected the enforcement and conservation of forest resources in general in the same way it did in Ghana (Hansen and Lund, 2011). This study has established that some politicians know that their private interest can not be achieved through formal forest institutions. In this case,

informal institutions become their operation rules (Ostrom, 1990). These politicians use their positions of power to influence the police from arresting their clients when found violating forest and impounding their vehicles or their clients' vehicle when caught. These politicians could go to police stations and tamper with evidence using their position of power, to stop the prosecution of their clients. They could successfully do this by playing around the established formal institutions to achieve these goals as stated by Cleaver and De Koning (2015). All police officers who had been abiding by these rules have been rewarded and those not playing by these rules have had been punished per the rules of institutions (North, 1991), and labelled as not "ours" as the ZP1 put it

*"Ukapanda kuvomera zomwe iwowo akufuna amapanga zoti  
akulange pokusamutsira kumudzi".*

*As a punishment, they are transfer you to other districts or remote  
areas where the patrons of the party have no interest.*

Politicians could sometimes call the police to release these clients. Due to their power, the police complied to their orders. This is done as a way of rewarding and sharing political spoils to the clients or subjects (Hansen and Lund, 2011).

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#### ***4.4.3. The views of Dedza and Zomba district local councils on the effectiveness of forest institutions***

The officer from Dedza and Zomba district council stated that both the Forest Act and their by-laws are good, and those who violate these laws are punished by the

councils. The ZCC1 disclosed that tools are taken away from the people who are caught cutting down, transporting, or carrying trees in the city illegally. When one is found cutting down endangered species they take them to the police. This is to make sure that trees and forests are protected within the city. However, the respondent from the council expressed discontentment by the light punishments, because they do not deter people from violating them. This makes the forest formal institutions to be ineffective. The forest laws according to the district council officers fail to withstand the test of time for them to be effective.

DDC1 also pointed out that some politicians do interfere with the management of trees. They can order the harvesting of trees without adhering to the advice of the bureaucrats who are expertise in this area, for example the cutting of immature trees. ZCC1 concurred with DDC1 that some from the DPP led government powerful elected leaders, also interfere if some of the people of their ward are caught violating the rules. DDC1 stated that these leaders allow their people to use forest trees unsustainably to gain political mileage. These leaders also demand that their people should be acquitted by the city council. When asked why they bow down to their demands, ZCC1 disclosed that some of these councillors were connected to the ruling party of the previous governments, such that, they are afraid for their work.

What the politicians have been doing concerning the forests of Dedza and Zomba mountain forest reserve concurs with the studies by Chakravarty et al, (2012) and Le Bellion (2002). They noted that the interest of the politicians in forest resources is to use them for their political career, that is for political patronage and rent-seeking (Hansen and Lund, 2011).

On the other hand, ZDC1 informed the researcher that the people themselves, still violate the rules as a result of not having any means to sustain their lives. The officer from the council informed the researcher that current institutional arrangements do not benefit the communities close to forests. ZDC1 stated that

*“Mwachitsanzo ku mbali yokolola mitengo amakhala obwera  
amene amapindula kupatsidwa ma licence komanso kuloledwa”*

*(ZDC1)*

*“Fore example the people are not given a chance to harvest the  
trees, the people who benefit and given licences to harvest trees  
are from outside of the area” (ZDC1)*

From the perspective of the Zomba local councils, the Forest policy has failed to allow the people of the communities around the forest of Zomba to benefit from these forests. This is against what is stated in one of the policy statement of Malawi regarding the people living close to the forests reserves benefiting from the forests, which states that the communities living around the forest ought to have a share of the benefits of the forests (Government of Malawi). In this sense due to the failure of the forest department to allow the communities of Zomba as stakeholders to have a share of the benefits of the forest resources the forest policy is not effective (Peters, 2019).

#### ***4.4.4 The views of traditional leaders in Dedza on the effectiveness of forest institutions***

The traditional leaders in Dedza and Zomba have observed that the formal institutions which include the Forest Act and Policy are good but they are not effective because of a lack of staff to enforce and implement those institutions. There are fewer people to

help in slashing down and clearing grass in the fire-breaks, and the overall management of Dedza mountain forest. The traditional leader said rules are there, but are not effective as people do go in the forest and cut trees illegally, but the chief stated that they have not caught anyone yet. In his words, he also stated that

*“Ena amakapanga macheke mobisa mu phiri la Dedza ndi machine awo” (DT1)*

*“Some go into the forest and process their timber secretly and illegally with their machines”*

In addition to this, some people connive with the forest officers, to cut trees illegally but secretly but it is not common.

ZT1 recommended the institutional arrangement of bringing the cooperatives into the equation of forest management in the Zomba mountain forest. He stated that this is a good arrangement because, with the coming in of cooperatives, trees in the forest are at least taken care of than in the past years before the cooperatives were established. ZT1 added that that people do violate forest rules and he has been witnessing people harvesting trees illegally, and carrying out immature trees from the forest. From the perspective of traditional leaders, the forest formal laws have failed to deter other stakeholders from violating those laws. The argument is that the cost they pay when they violate these formal laws are less than the benefit of violating these laws (Howlet et al, 2013). As a result of this, they chose not to abide by the forest institutions as they do not realise their interest in them (Peters, 2019)

#### ***4.4.5 The views of Dedza and Zomba forest officers on the effectiveness of the forest institutions***

In understanding the effectiveness of the forest institutions, this section will be by quoting the ZF1, who said that

*“Forest regulations are obvious, but not obvious for Malawi”.*

By this it was learned from ZF1 that politics interfere with the implementation of the forest regulations. This study has learned from the ZF1, that

*“The forest Act is good and in most areas, it is working, but could have been made better”.*

The DF1, from Dedza, shared the same view and lamented that the forest laws and the rules of the game have not withstood the test of time. Old laws and fines could amount up to K12 000. As a result of this, they do not deter people from violating them because the money they profit from their business is more than what they are charged after persecution. One of the DF1 lamented that

*“Zakhala zikumawapweteka kuti anthu samamva kuwawa, kuti wagwidwa ndi nkhuni zambiri koma amatchajidwa ndalama zochepa, tikapita ku khoti amamangotulutsa ndalamazo akusekerera, komanso akutiseka”.*

*“It has been hurting us that the people who violate these laws do not feel the pain for breaking the law. After being charged to pay fines, they are charged to pay little amounts of money. When we go*



*to court they just take out the money, they are charged while smiling and laughing at us”.*

The DF1 added that illegal harvesting and transportation of trees has become a norm. The forest institutions have not stood the test of time. Some of the penalties that used to deter people from violating the rules of governing forest, fail to deter people because the value of money has gone down. This is contrary to what Peters (2019) presented on good institutions that they have to be reviewed and changed to serve the needs of that time. Kayambazinthu (200) argued that people used to fear violating the forest laws during the time of the one-party government era in Malawi when Kamuzu Banda was the president, because of severe punishments attached to those lawbreakers, but now the punishments are less severe to deter people from violating them. This study agrees with the findings by Mauambeta (2010), that some people are no longer afraid to have their vehicles, bicycles and panga knives taken away from them because they know that they are going to redeem them. They know that if the forest office takes them to court they will be asked to pay fines as a penalty for breaking statutory laws. These fines are low in terms of their monetary value with respect to current inflation rates. The fines that these people are charged are lower than the harm they cause to forests and the benefit they realise after withdrawing these forest resources illegally. As a result of this, these people as rational beings, see it fit and better to violate these rules.

It was also learnt from DF1 that some people hire lorries to help them carry processed timber and logs from the forest during the night, while the forest guards are asleep. In some instances, they cross the border with trees so that they are not caught in Malawi and the trees are sold in Mozambique. In addition to this, the DF1 admitted that some

of the officers (Forest guards) are involved in corruption, but it was learnt that they have put in place a good monitoring system, and measures to discipline those caught involved in those corrupt practices and to put an end to corruption. The officers were confident to note that cases of bribery are becoming uncommon now in their department at Dedza.

Another issue that this study discovered was a shortage of staff. In the past, there used to have enough staff than now. In addition to this, the researcher learnt that they do not have adequate gun, motor vehicles and motorcycles to be used for mobility purposes. The forestry department does not only need qualified staff only for it to successfully implement its formal institutions but also adequate staff (Howlet et al, 2013). Shortage of staff in both Dedza and Zomba mountain forests means few forest guards, few ground labourers, forest extension workers, and plantations officers. The argument here is that institutions require agents to enforce them (North, 1991). There is a lot of workload for the forest officers. A lot of plots in the forest of Dedza and Zomba do not have forest guards to protect the areas. As a result, people take advantage of this to steal trees from the forests. This also includes all other activities like tree planting, making fire breaks, and slashing bush in the forest. Inadequate forest officers mean that there are fewer officers to enforce and implement formal forest institutions. This has led to policy paralysis, as the policy is not able to achieve its goals.

The ZF1 claimed that the in-effectiveness of the forest laws and rules is due to the politicians who intervene in the running of forests. These politicians do not allow the practitioners to manage the forest with their expertise. These politicians have manipulated Forest Department system to allow people not competent enough to

manage their forests. People without skills and expertise on how to harvest trees are allowed to harvest. Most forest people working now are not competent enough as they were not trained enough on how to manage forests. The forest department lacks well-qualified staff and adequate staff in general. Effective implementation of forest institutional rules require well-qualified staff for it to achieve the goals which it was meant to achieve (Howlet et al 2013). Well-qualified forest officers do make sure that policies are implemented rightly, and how to enforce them as well as controlling other stakeholders involved so that they serve their interest of the public by conserving the forest (Peters, 2019). For example, Kayambazinthu (2000), noted that one of the reasons why Malawian forestry was praised for its efficient and effective conservational management of forests during the mid-20th century, was because of its well-experienced forest staff.

ZF1 also added that the coming in of new political leaders affected the positioning of experts. Experts were misplaced into other areas, The change in the political system since 1994 has led to political leaders making irrational decisions of filling incompetent staff in the forestry department, as noted by Hansen and Lund (2011). for example, the researchers were placed in positions of management. The implementation of some policies always depends on research and well-informed decisions. Not having well-qualified staff has led to ineffective implementation of forest rules.

The researcher also learnt from DF1 that as a mechanism to fill the gap of shortage of staff, the forest officers have informants, who inform them when they see people cutting down trees illegally, or transporting trees from the forests. They have people who help as informants for the forestry. The lack of staff in the forest department in

Dedza has made it to decide to mould the formal institutions for the sake of achieving the informal arrangement so that they complement and fill the gap that has been created by the shortage of forest guards (Cleaver and De Koning). This arrangement has been established with some local people to act as informants for the Forestry Department so that they inform the forest department. The arrangement has been effective as the forest officers have been able to take track and stop those who go and harvest trees illegally. This kind of arrangement is absent in the Zomba forest department, despite having and facing the same problem

It was also learnt that the implementation of the forest policy requires enough funding for it to be effectively enforced and implemented. The respondents disclosed that the forest department receives low funding. As a result, activities that are done in the implementation of the policy are partly paralysed. ZF1 explained that the funding has not been enough since 1994. The paralysis of these activities has left a lot of forest reserves without trees. Adequate funds are very significant in the implementation and enforcement of the forest rules. Howlet et al (2013), argued that adequate funds are essential for a successful implementation of the policy. The forest department needs adequate funds to protect, maintain and conserve the forest. This study concurs with the findings by Mauambeta (2010 )that the forest department does not receive adequate funds to help them in their work of making decisions of who gets what, when and how with respect to forest resources (Harrison and Boyd, 2003). Most of the activities at the forest department have been suspended because of the lack of these funds, making the formal institutions not effective and rationale for dealing with the forest problem of forest degradation.

This study found out that politicians, during the previous DPP governments, politicians have been intervening in the management of forest in the district. The forest officers, ZF2, ZF1, DF1 and DF2 disclosed that these politicians had been demanding plots for harvesting from the forest officers. If allocated the plots, these politicians could harvest more trees than the ones allocated to them. Other people in the district are not only connected to the political party but also well connected to the police such that when arrested for violations of forest rules, they are easily released. ZF1, concurred with DF2, by stating that the Minister as the top authority in deciding who harvests trees in the forestry department abuse this authority to include their people who do not harvest responsibly. ZF1 explained that forest officers are there to recommend, the final say is always in the hands of the Minister. Political involvement in some agreements is not informed by research or facts. The ZF1 added that when people related to political leaders in government are caught violating the law, the political leaders call the forest officer or the director of forestry and say

*“The Minister calls you and says please can you help. Even when communities have broken the law the Minister comes in and say please help my people, acquit them”*

DF2 added that

*“If there is a forest officer who does not bow to their pressure, they tell their leaders in government who communicate to your superiors and they move you to work in another place, or district*

ZF2 narrated a story about his fellow forest staff who refused to bow down to the pressure of giving party member of DPP, a plot to harvest trees illegally

*“Ndinangomva hello, uyu “X” muchotseni mumusamutse kuno  
apite dera lina chifukwa siwath”*

*I heard, hello, this person “X” transfer him from this district to  
another place because he is not one of our own” (DF2)*

He was transferred as his superiors also bowed down to the directive and demands of the political leaders. In addition to this, they also interfere with the extension services of buying and planting seedling. The politicians always tell the forest extension workers that they will supply seedlings for planting, in tree seedlings planting projects. As pointed out that

*“If they deliver, they deliver poor quality of trees, otherwise they  
get the money but do not deliver the trees at all” (DF2)*

This study has also found from ZF1 that political decisions have also affected the review of the forest policy and act. For example, it has been tough as politicians have been avoiding review the law on Charcoal. The politicians have always been afraid of enforcing the regulations on Charcoal burning and selling, for fear of losing their political support and their benefits which they accrue from the charcoal business, as some are involved in this charcoal business. The current forest formal institutions are good for the politicians as they are malleable to satisfy their political interests as argued by Cleaver and De Koning (2015). These politicians can mould and manoeuvre and play around and reshape these institutions (Cleaver and De Koning) so that they get access to access forest trees to use them to reward their political clients. This study concurs with Zulu (2010), that politicians always abuse their positions to violate forest formal laws, for their benefit. This argument agrees with

the argument advanced by Larson and Ribot (2007), that politicians use both formal and informal institutions to advance their interest at the expense of the public. This study has also discovered that forest institutions have created two groups of stakeholders, which are winners and losers (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). The winners who include those who benefit from the institutions resist change knowing that it will negatively affect them (Howlet et al, 2019), this is why the review of forest laws has been resisted by politicians.

Politicians use their political power as the highest authority in the forest department to achieve their own goals, and forest resources are used as the means for getting political gains (Hansen and Lund, 2011). In addition to this, due to their interest in maximising their utility, they influence the allocation of plots, including forcing the officers to grant them, or their client's plots with immature trees. They harvest more trees than those that they are allocated as noted by Chakravarty et al, (2012) and Le Bellion (2002), who argued that when politicians are offered 1 hectare to harvest trees, they end up harvesting 2 hectares. These politicians use the same formal institution's arrangements to achieve their political interests, by factoring in clientelism to compete with formal institutions, as argued by Cleaver and De Koning (2015) to achieve their own goals. This is similar to the arguments that were advanced by Hansen and Lund (2011), that politicians in Ghana had used their power to intervene in the management of forests to reward their political clients. In addition to this, these politicians in Malawi do sacrifice environmental rationality to achieve political informal rationality in their capacity as patrons. This is in line with the argument that was advanced by Hansen and Lund (2011) and Le Bellion (2002), that politicians always advance political interests at the expense of conserving forests so that they can discharge their political duties as patrons.

#### **4.5 The effects of the forest institutions on the conservation of forest**

This section outlines the findings and discussion of these findings on the effects of the effectiveness of formal and informal institutions on the conservation of forest. The effectiveness of both formal and informal institutions have brought both positive and negatives results in the implementation of forest policy in the conservation of forests in Malawi.

##### ***4.5.1. The perceptions of people involved in timber and charcoal business on the effects of forest institutions on forest conservation***

All the respondents from Dedza and Zomba agreed that the rules have partly helped to conserve the remaining trees in the forest. In a similar vein, ZN5 argued that the roadblocks that are there in forest road going to Chawe have helped to check those transporting trees illegally, and those who cut the trees illegally. The argument here is that the rules on the protection of trees have been beneficial in protecting the trees in the forest from totally free for all problem which could have depleted the forests in Malawi as observed by Hardin (1968). The argument here is that without rules governing forest resources or authorities to regulate the use and extraction of the forest resources ruin is always the destination (ibid). However, it should be noted that some devise their ways to out beat these rules thereby negatively affecting the conservation of trees. These respondents viewed the punishments, to have deterred some from further violation of forest rules, while others continue violating forest rules knowing that they will bribe some forest officers, but this is not common for people who withdraw timber from the forests.



This study further found out that the shortage of staff and lack of authority to enforce rules have led to the degradation of the forest in Dedza and Zomba as some people take advantage of this to advance their interest in cutting trees and transporting them illegally.

The respondents viewed the shortage of forest officers to have affected the management of the forest resources negatively. They added that this problem has also affected the patrol of forest areas and how to deal with the fire and the people who cause it leading to forest degradation. This study is of the view that the rules themselves are good, but they cannot enforce themselves, there is always a need for agents of the state to enforce these formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Shortage of staff to enforce and implement the forest formal rules in the forest sector has led to fewer trees planted every year in areas that have been harvested. This has also led to huge areas of forest reserve open and not protected from illegal harvesters and transporters. As a result, the problems of illegal deforestation and forest transportation are on the rise. These problems were highlighted by Kambewa et al (2007), Yaron et al (2011), Mutimba and Kamoto (2017). For example, DN6 pointed out that

*“Tangoganizani, madera monga Mapale, Sowmil, ndi ku waterboard madera awawa ndi akuluakulu amayang’anilidwa ndi anthu atatu, nde akuba amadziwa zimenezi ndiye amapita dala akudziwa kuti sakagwidwa ndi chifukwa chake mitengo ikuonongeka”*

*“Just imagine areas like Mapale, Sawmill and waterboard are big, but they are looked after by one person, so those who steal trees*

*from the forests, know this and take advantage of it, that's the reason why trees are depleting in the forest of Dedza.*

This study has established that the illegal harvesting of trees has negatively affected the conservation of trees. In addition to this study has learnt from DN9 that the change of the responsibility of forest officers on harvesting trees and sell them, to that of allowing other players who are not competent and experts on how to harvest trees has negatively affected the conservation of trees in the Dedza mountain. This is so because the forest officers are the ones who are vested with knowledge on how best to harvest the trees sustainably. These arguments are in line with what Kayambazinthu (2000) noted that lack of expertise affected the conservation of forests in Malawi. This has resulted in the forest formal institutions not achieving their goals

Charcoal producers from both Dedza and Zomba informed the researcher that the forest formal rules have not deterred charcoal producers and sellers, as they always pay the fines, bribe the police and the forest officers. The informal rules of not permitting the forest officers and police officers to come close to places where charcoal is produced have negatively affected the conservation of trees in both Chingale and Phalombe. In addition to this as narrated by CCZ2, the lack of a village forest committee that used to protect trees has also affected the conservation of trees in Chingale negatively as the people feared it more than the forest officers. This study stands with the argument by Kayambazinthu (2000) that the failure of the current policy to provide severe punishments as it was during the Kamuzu Banda's government, has led to people not to fear violating forest laws, knowing that the punishments which are applied to those who violate them as argued by North (1991) are light to deter them. This justifies the argument by Yaron et al (2011), that the

current forest policies have not only proved to be ineffective but encourage inefficient illicit charcoaling and illegal deforestation. This is the case because of a lack of enforcement. As a result of this, there has been an increase in unsustainable charcoal production and deforestation, leading to forest degradation.

On the part of cooperatives, the researcher learnt that the cooperatives have helped a lot in the management and conservation of trees in the Zomba mountain forest. On the part of the government, the researcher found out from ZC1 of the cooperative that the failure of the government to replant and take care of trees has negatively affected the conservation of trees in the forest of Zomba. The cooperatives are promised to be given licences to harvest trees if they help in the management of forest. This makes the cooperative respect the forest rules, this in turn, has helped to conserve the forest resources in the forest of Zomba.

The dark side of these cooperatives is that there is always a barrier to entry in these cooperatives as a means of managing their cooperative to benefit more from the limited forest resources. This is the case because they would want to make sure that the plots allocated and shared among the members during harvesting season are enough to cover the cost and make them realise profits too. As a result of this, the cooperative and forestry department make sure that the cooperatives maintain a good size of the cooperative so that the cake of the forest is enough to share amongst themselves. This kind of arrangement is similar to the one that was described by Green and Lund (2014). Green and Lund (2014), noted that this arrangement ends up benefiting one group at the expense of other groups who are not members of the cooperatives in this case. The members of the cooperatives become the winners while the non-members are losers of these institutions. The people left out to enter these

cooperatives resort to harvesting trees illegally, as a way of realising the benefits which they could not get by abiding by the formal institutions (Helmek and Levitsky, 2004). This in turn negatively affects the conservation of forests.

The success story of the cooperatives managing part of the Zomba forest is not replicated in Dedza. In Dedza the forest department failed to put in place, good working arrangement, and good working operational rules (Ostrom, 1990) which could enable cooperatives to manage the part of the forest. As a result of this the cooperative that was established knew that they could not manage to honour the rules of their agreement with the Dedza forestry Department. They saw the weaknesses of the working rules and worked around these institutions to achieve their interest. They exploited the trees, made profits, defaulted the agreement (Cleaver and De Koning, 2015) then it was disbanded. This meant that they harvested more than what they planted and managed, and this negatively affected the management of trees in Dedza forest, leading to forest degradation.

#### ***4.5.2. The views of the Dedza and Zomba police officers on the effects of forest institutions on the conservation of forests***

It was learnt from DP1 that the institutions have partly helped to help stop the depletion of trees in Dedza mountain. The statutory nature of the forest offences has not effectively helped in the conservation. This is one of the contributing factors that has made the forest policy and act not to be good institutions as argued by Peters (2019). The forest act and policy has failed to deter, shape and constrain the behaviour of forest resources users from violating the forest rules as argued by

Mutimba and Kamoto (2017). As a result, the cost of violating the rules is less costly than the benefits they derive from operating outside these rules (Peters, 2010). This has contributed to forest degradation from the police department point of view.

Secondly, political interference has also affected the conservation of trees. This is so because politicians give orders to tamper with evidence. These politicians make sure that they move evidence, whether it is a vehicle used to transport the illegal forest resources, and the resources themselves. Or they intimidate the officers in charge of the prosecution. Unfortunately, it was learnt from ZP1 that most of the big cases of gross violation of forest statutory rules were dropped, and the same people connected to the government or the ruling party continued violating these rules. Consequently, this has contributed to the degradation of forest resources in Zomba. The intervention of the politicians in government in the work of the police department has compromised the latter. This finding slightly diverts from the arguments raised by Zulu (2010), who only concentrated on how political interference in the enforcement of forest laws disrupted the work of forestry officers, without looking at how the same interference compromise the work of the police officers in enforcing forest laws. It was also learnt from ZP1 that some Police officers from Zomba, unlike Dedza, often abide by the informal rules which become the operating rules (Ostrom, 1990), for fear of sanctions if they choose not to obey them (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). As a result, forest resources have suffered exploitation due to these acts.

#### ***4.5.3 The views of the Dedza and Zomba local council officers on the effects of forest institutions on the conservation of forests***

The researcher found that the ineffectiveness of the rules has negatively affected the conservation and management of forests in Dedza and Zomba. This is so because the

people continue to violate the laws, through illegal harvesting and transportation of trees. This means that more areas are cleared than they are replanted. ZDC1 argued that the present institutional arrangement has left the forest resources vulnerable because the people living close to these forests do not have any other reliable means of earning a living. In addition to this, because the people living close to these forests do not benefit, they resort to illegal withdrawal of forest resources, which negatively affect the forest resource. The findings of this study were closely similar to the arguments advanced by Larson and Ribot (2007), who argued that the local people living close to the forests are not always the primary beneficiaries of these forests. Larson and Ribot (2007) argued that the institutions are manipulated so that the local and urban-based elites. This study has confirmed it with respect to the Dedza and Zomba mountain forests. People living close to these forests do not benefit at abiding by the formal institutions. As a result of this, they resort to unlawful extractions, deforestation of forests, as their only means to achieve their interests (Peters, 2019). This in turn negatively affects forests conservation

On the other hand, DDC1, ZDC1 and ZCC1, noted that the politicians in power have interfered in the work of conserving the forest. They reported that politicians demand forest plots for their clients, where harvesting take place without adhering to the advice of the forest or environmental officers. This result in the harvesting of immature trees. ZCC1 informed the researcher that politics has also affected the conservation of trees, as they are afraid to enforce certain rules due to the power of these politicians. This has affected the conservation of forest resources (Culhane, 2011). This study concurs with the findings by Hansen and Lund (2010 that politicians always intervenes in the enforcement of forest to advance their interest, which in turn produce negative results which harm forests. For example, the forcing

of local councils to acquit the people that are caught violating forest laws encourages the illicit behaviour of these people. This is the case because these people know that they have the backing of these politicians, who can override the decision made by these local councils. This is similar to what has been happening in the United States of America (Culhane2011),. This has made the forest formal institutions not achieve their goals.

#### ***4.5.4 The views of the Dedza traditional leader on the effects of the effectiveness of forest institutions on the conservation of forests***

The DT1 and ZT1 admitted that the rules are good, but the lack of staff to enforce and implement these rules has led to the degradation of the forest in Dedza and zomba. The traditional leader observed that limited number of forestry officers to oversee the work of vast forest has meant that the people can steal trees without being caught. On the other, the cooperatives have helped in recovering the lost glory of Zomba forests. As a result, most forest areas are not taken care of, leading to degradation. In addition to this, rules have failed to stop people from logging and transporting timber from the forest illegally, leading to the degradation of the forest Dedza. According to North's (1991) definition of institutions as rules, one of the characteristics of these institutions is that they are enforced. For forest institutions to be good and successful in the achievement of their goals as argued by Peters (2019), there is a need for enough forest officers both at forest headquarter and field offices. Howlet et al (2013), argued that for the successful implementation of policies bureaucrats who act as implementers are critical in this stage. Concerning forest policies, the lack of enough forest officers to implement and enforce the forest rules has meant that forest resources are prone to exploitation and degradation. As a result of the lack of these

officers a lot of trees have been harvested illegally in most forests including Zomba and Dedza mountain reserve forests, and this confirms the findings by (Mauambeta, 2010).

***4.5.5. The views of the Dedza and Zomba forest officers on the effects of the effectiveness of forest institutions on the conservation of forests***

The Forest officers from Dedza were satisfied with the relationship they established with the informants because it has helped them to be informed about suspects who are seen harvesting trees illegally, in areas where the forest officers are absent there's. As a result, this has helped to save some trees which could have been stolen and harvested immaturely. The moulding of the formal institutions of the forest laws (Cleaver and De Koning), to include the local informants has helped to at least conserve the trees in the mountain. On the other hand, this arrangement is absent in Zomba. The lack of this arrangement in Zomba has meant that some of the trees keep on being harvested illegally and transported without the knowledge of the forest officers, in areas where they cannot monitor or protect.

The researcher also learnt from DF1 that there is a lack of enforcement of some rules due to poor funding. This has negatively affected the conservation of forests because they are not able to perform some of the forest activities according to their calendar on time. This has led to the accumulation of undone activities lead to forest degradation. This argument concurs with Howlet et al (2013), that funding is critical for a successful implementation of a policy. Lack of adequate funding has made it not achieve its goals.



The forest officers from both Dedza and Zomba also raised the issue of light punishments that are there and how they have negatively affected the forest sector as people continue to violate the rules in the forest sector. This is so because people are not afraid of the consequences of breaking the law. They go to harvest trees with their vehicles and machines. This has made the forest institutions to be bad according to Peters (2019), as they fail to withstand the test of time and achieve their goals. The forest officers noted that the situation is always worse when those breaking the law are connected to the DPP led government and have connections at the police because they take themselves as untouchables. This has led to the degradation of forest resources.

From the Forest officers' point of view, it was discovered that the change of political system and the change of institutional arrangement for managing forests in Malawi has negatively affected the rational means of managing forests, as most staff who do not know how best to manage trees are now running forests. According to the findings from both Dedza and Zomba mountain forest reserves, the forest department does not just need staff, but qualified staff. This study is of the view that expertise is critical for the conservation of forest in Malawi. This study differs from the study that was conducted by Green and Lund (2014), who did not state the effects of expertise on the forest. This study concurs with the study by Kayambazinthu (2000) who noted that lack of expertise to help in the effective management of forest in local areas resulted in low survival of the trees planted. Mauambeta (2010) concurred with Kayambazinthu (2000), that expertise in forest conservation is significant. This study has found that qualified forest personnel are needed for forest conservation. The forest department as noted by ZF1 lacks well-qualified staff who would execute forest rules, according to their expertise and make well-informed decisions from research.

The absence of this kind of staff has led to the planting of trees which would not withstand the weather, resist Malawian pests, diseases, fire, and grow well on tropical soil. This in turn has made the forest formal institutions appear to be bad institutions according to Peters (2019) as they fail to achieve their goals due to a lack of qualified staff to execute the laws

Political clientelism has also negatively affected the good means of managing trees, as some party loyalists just come to ask for the plot to harvest trees, and then demand to be given. This makes the forest officers afraid and not to work to the best of their knowledge in the implementation and enforcement of the policy and the act. The use of the forestry department by politicians to have access to forest resources as a means to gain their political mileage, has affected the successful implementation of the forest policy. The system of political patronage as an informal institution used by political leaders to advance their political interest is similar to the system used by politicians, in the forest resources of Ghana. Hansen and Lund (2011) argued that politicians intervened in the forest sector by granting favours to particular agents and individuals in a system of political patronage, where those bestowed with special opportunities provide “pay-backs” in the form of votes or campaign contribution. It was found that this negatively affected the conservation of forest in Ghana (Hansen and Lund, 2011). In the same vein, forest resources of Zomba and Dedza have been exploited by politicians to satisfy their political appetites leading to forest degradation of the two forests. These politicians use and mould the forest formal institutions to accommodate their informal institutions for them to achieve these interests (Cleaver and De Koning, 2015). The politicians in Malawi firstly, use their power to extract forest resources to reward their loyal members of the party. (Hekmke and Levitsky 2004). Secondly, they force forest officers to be allowed to harvest trees, without

following proper procedures. Thirdly, they demand forests officers to grant them permission to harvest immature, or reserved parts of the forests. Lastly they forcing forest officers to pardon their members who are caught, either by police or forest officers. This has contributed to the degradation of the forest.

The interference of politicians in starting political projects without asking advice from forest experts has also negatively affected the management and the conservation of forests. Projects do start without proper planning on how the trees planted are going to be taken care of, and whose responsibility will that be. Some politicians offer themselves to supply seedlings for planting which ends up, bringing poor quality trees, which they don't survive and also some don't supply at all. The politicians, on the other hand, have taken advantage of this situation to advance their private interest through these weak institutions (Helmke and Levitsky) by bending the rules to serve their interest (Cleaver and De Koning). They have done this by capitalising on this problem abuse their positions to supply low-quality seeds, which are not certified by the department, as a means to swindle money from the department. This has resulted in most trees not surviving after being planted. Hence this negatively affected the conservation and management of trees.

Lack of an institutional arrangement to make sure that all stakeholders work together has led to an increase in charcoal production and selling which has led to the depletion of trees. Umazi et al (2016), was of the view that most of the problems like that of charcoal, can be dealt with if there is an institutional arrangement that harmonises the interest of all stakeholders involved and works together. The argument here is that there should be institutions that cover the interest of at least these stakeholders so that their interest is realised in these institutions (Peters, 2019) to

conserve forests. The conservation of forests in Malawi needs the collaboration of the forest department, local councils, traditional leaders, local communities, police and the Malawi army, and politicians, to work together. Unfortunately, these stakeholders don't work together to achieve this, and this has negatively affected forest resources conservation.

This study is in line with the studies conducted by Mutimba and Kamoto (2017), and Yaron et al (2011), that the forest formal institutions have proved to be unproductive in achieving the goals from which they were established. Despite this productivity of unproductivity of the forest formal institutions being raised to relevant politicians in government, they have chosen to do nothing about it. This can be tied to the benefits they get through these unproductive formal institutions. Peters (2019) in his discussion of rational institutionalism, argued that institutions are deliberately created so that some individuals are controlled so as other actors can achieve their interest using the same institutions. In this case, the forest policy is used by politicians so that they can control forest officers in achieving these goals. This means of achieving their interest has brought negative results in the conservation of forest resources because politicians sacrifice the conservation rationality to achieve their political interests as noted by Hansen and Lund (2011).

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

This chapter has presented the findings of the data that was collected in Dedza and Zomba mountain forest reserve and the discussion of these findings on the politics of policy implementation in the forestry sector. These findings and discussions of them were based on the four objectives of the study. The presentation focused on the interest the stakeholders have and which motivate them to take part in the

management of forest resources in the forest of the Dedza and Zomba mountain forests reserve. Secondly, it analysed how these interests have affected the conservation of forests in these forest reserves. Thirdly this section assessed the effectiveness of forests institutions: which included both formal and informal institutions in constraining and directing the behaviour of the stakeholders. Lastly, it analysed the effects of these institutions in the conservation of forests.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

#### **5.1. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter concludes the study that was conducted in Dedza and Zomba mountain forest plantations. The first part of these sections provides the conclusion. The second part of this section provides the recommendations and the areas for further studies.

This study aimed at analysing how the politics of policy implementation affects the outcomes of forest policy in the forest sector. This study was motivated by the failure of the Malawi forest policy, due to continued forest degradation in Malawi (Hudak & Wessman, 2000). This study showed that the studies at the researcher's disposal neglected politics as the games among stakeholders within the implementation of forest policy as one of the main likely contributing factors of the causes of this problem (Leftwich, 2008).

The main argument that has been presented by this study that forest institutions, which are both formal and informal are at the centre of determining the effective implementation of both forest policy and act. The argument is that these institutions do present both incentives and disincentives to the stakeholders. This incentives do shape the behavior

This study aimed at filling the gap in the academic literature, by solving the puzzle that the literature presents from Malawi and other countries on the management of

forest resources and the implementation of forest policy, and on some of the games and the rules within these games. This study set out to firstly fill the gap left by Kambewa et al (2007) and Yaron et al (2011), on why informal institutions exist alongside formal institutions. Secondly, it set out to understand the conditions that allow the parasitic nature of political interference in the management of forest resources as observed by Zulu (2010), and the interest of these politicians in forest resources. Hansen and Lund (2011), found out that in Ghana politicians intervened in the forest sector by granting favours to particular agents and individuals in a system of political patronage, where those bestowed with special opportunities provide “pay-backs” in the form of votes or campaign contributions. This study aimed at discovering if these cases can be similar or different with regard to political interference in the management of forest resources. Lastly, this study aimed at understanding why and what makes the policies inadequate as established by Yaron et al (2007) and to establish the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of current policy on banning charcoal, and what other factors contribute to the ineffectiveness of the policy.

In an attempt to solve this puzzle, this study set out firstly to assess the interest of some of the stakeholders in the management of forest resources in the Dedza and Zomba forest reserves. The aim was to understand what motivates these stakeholders to take part in the withdrawal and the conservation of these resources. This helped to analyse the effects of these interest on the behaviour of the stakeholders with respect to forest formal institutions. Secondly, the study investigated the effects of these interest on the implementation of forest policy. The aim was to understand how the actions of these stakeholders with respect to their interest affect the conservation of forests. Thirdly, this study assessed the effectiveness of forest institutions in enabling

and constraining the behaviour of these stakeholders in the management of forest resources. This was done by assessing the extent to which both formal and informal institutions successfully enable or constrain the behaviour of these stakeholders. Lastly, this study analysed how both the formal and informal institutions have affected the conservation of the forests in Malawi.

This study adopted two perspectives of politics. The first one is Harold Laswell's definition of politics. He defined politics as who gets what when and how (Harrison and Boyd, 2003). This is about how resources are distributed and re-distributed in society (Patel, and Svasand, 2013). This definition helped in the analysis of the management of the forest resources and the institutions that guide the behaviour of the forest stakeholders in their use of forest resources.

The second perspective was that of Leftwich (2008). He argued that politics take place at two distinct levels: the rules of the game and the games within the rules. The games within the rules referred to the interaction between stakeholders in the implementation of the forest policy. In this stage, the focus is on the stakeholders who are not constrained by institutions in shaping and making their decisions but are rather guided by their interest in devising ways to play around the formal rules, and sometimes use informal rules to achieve their own desired goals, in the course of maximising their utilities by playing around these formal rules. This level was relevant for this study in that it helped to understand why these stakeholders choose to abide or not to abide by forest laws.

The study used the qualitative method to collect data. The study had a sample size of 27 respondents. 13 respondents were from Dedza and 14 respondents were from



Zomba. Semi-structured and key informant interviews were used as qualitative methods of data collection. Content analysis was used to analyse the collected data.

This study adopted the rational choice institutionalism theory for its analysis. This theory was relevant for this study firstly, because it helped to understand whether the Malawi forest institutions create an environment where the interest of the stakeholders are realised. Secondly, it sought to analyse the effectiveness of the institutions to achieve their intended goals, and to interrogate on whether does it stand the test of time, is it able to constrain and enable the behaviour of other stakeholders or it serves the interest of other stakeholders who use it to control other stakeholders within the forestry sector.

On the first gap, this study agrees with the arguments by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), that the informal institutions exist along with the formal institutions because they serve the interest of the forest stakeholders, which are undesirable by the public. Some stakeholders of forest resources like forest and police officers, charcoal producers and sellers, and illegal timber harvesters and transporters have interests that cannot be achieved through formal institutions. At the same time, they don't want to do away with the formal institutions, knowing that their interest can only be achieved by the same institutions (Peters, 2019). There are only two means through which their interest can be achieved. Firstly, is by moulding and reshaping these institutions, and not changing them completely so that they serve their interests (Cleaver and De Koning, 2015). Ministers in the ministry responsible for the department of forestry, abuse their position, often using the same forest laws for their interest. Secondly, they use informal rules to achieve their interest if they are not able to mould or reshape the formal institutions. This is the reason why clientelism, bribery and corruption are

existing alongside formal forest institutions. Therefore, informal institutions continue to exist alongside formal institutions suppressing them in the attainment of their goals.

On the second gap, this study has established that politicians use forest resources as instruments for political gains (Hansen and Lund, 2011) for three main reasons. Firstly, forest resources are used for mobilising support from the electorates. This study has established that politicians encourage the people of their constituencies to use forest resources close to them as they please. If these people are caught violating forest laws by the police, forest or local council officers, they force them to release and acquit them, as one way of winning their support. Secondly, these politicians use forest resources as a way of rewarding their political loyalist as argued by Helmke and Levitsky (2004). This study has established that politicians use forest resources to reward their political clients. Politicians in government use forest resources for political patronage and rent-seeking (Chakravarty et al, 2012, and Le Bellion, 2002). In this case, forest resources are used as material rewards to their clients who helped them to be in power. As a result, they force forest officers to allocate plots to these clients for harvesting. Lastly, politicians use forest resources to satisfy their self appetites by enriching themselves (Hansen and Lund, 2011). Political leaders in Malawi view forest resources as spoils of political war, which they get after winning elections (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). They use these spoils as sources of income to finance their personal and political use (Anderson, 2006), at the expense of forest conservation. The above interests of politicians lead to the adoption of policies that are politically rational in their eyes, but irrational in the conservation of forests as noted by Hansen and Lund (2011).

Thirdly, this study has discovered that the forest policy is inadequate in conserving the forests in Malawi as argued by Yaron et al (2011), for three main reasons. Firstly,

institutions as explained by North (1991), do prescribe rewards for those who follow them and punishments for those who violate them. For these institutions to deter people from violating them they need to offer harsh punishments. The current forest laws offer light punishments in form of fines to those who violate them. Instead of these fines to act as a deterrence, they are regarded as the small cost incurred in the course of business which is covered by the profits they realise in their illegal businesses. As such, these people are not deterred from violating these laws. Secondly, for these rules to be effective they need enough officers to enforce them. Institutions require agents who could enforce them for them to be implemented effectively (Howlet et al, 2013). Unfortunately, the forest department in Malawi does not have enough forest officers to enforce the forest laws, monitor the management of trees and protect trees. As a result of this other stakeholders take advantage of the incapacity of the forest department to harvest and transport timber illegally during the time, and places where they know that the forest officers will not be around guarding. This makes the forest laws fail to achieve their intended goals, making them bad institutions as argued by Peters (2019).

Fourthly, the forestry department lack well-qualified forest officer who would manage forests according to their expertise in the conservation of forests as observed by Kayambazinthu (2000) and Mauambeta (2010). Currently, this study has found that the forest department of both Dedza and Zomba mountain forests lack well-qualified staff who would be responsible for effective management of the forest. This includes making sure that the right trees suitable for the areas are planted, well pruned, and good harvesting methods are employed. And also conducting research on how best to manage forests. The lack of well-qualified forest officers to manage the forests in

Dedza and Zomba mountain forest has negatively affected the conservation of forests in these areas.

Lastly, the current policy requires the coordinated effort of all stakeholders involved in forest resources management to work together in making sure that the forest laws work effectively. This study agrees with the argument by Umazi et al (2016), that the effective implementation of forest laws requires all stakeholders to play their role in making sure the forest laws work. In Malawi, these stakeholders include the forest department, local councils, the police department, traditional leaders, and the people who use these forests. This study has established that there is a lack of coordination and collaboration of these stakeholders in the conservation of forest. The local councils do not fully cooperate and work together with the forest department in the fight against illegal charcoal business, as they still collect market fees from these illegal charcoal sellers in their market. Traditional leaders do not want to cooperate with the forest department in the conservation of forest, because they are always looking for benefits. And the police department in Dedza is always waiting to be called to help them actively participate in the enforcement of forest laws. This lack of coordination and collaboration of these stakeholders has negatively affected the conservation of forest in Dedza and Zomba.

## **5.2. Areas for further studies**

This study proposes the following areas as qualified for further studies in forest policy. Firstly, this study suggests an evaluation study of the whole 1996 and 2016 Malawi forest policy. This study will help in the discovery of where policy failure starts in one of the policy stages in the policy cycle. The argument behind this proposal is that the policy failure of the forest policy might not originate in the

implementation process. This evaluation will help to trace where the problem of policy failure starts in the policy cycle stages.

Secondly, In addition to this, this study proposes a further analysis on other factors that made the Malawian forestry department to be praised for the vibrant and well-conserved forests apart from professionalism as argued by Mayers et al (2001). According to the Malawi forest policy of 2016, it clearly states the importance of the administration which is the forest department. This means that the forest department is critical in the effective implementation of the forest policy. A comparative study on the Malawi forest department of the mid-century and the new department, to find out what made the forest department to be effective in managing forests, could be significant for effective implementation of the forest policy.

Thirdly, this study also proposes, a study on factors that can lead to better collaboration among stakeholders for efficient and effective working relationship in the implementation of the Malawi Forest Policy. This study has found out that there is no good working relationship among the forestry department, the police department, the local councils, traditional leaders and people involved in the timber business. This study would include investigating the stakeholders regarding what they envisage on what can help to improve the collaboration among them in the implementation of the forest policy. This would help to understand the factors that would help in the creation of a conducive environment where these stakeholders would work together in the implementation of the forest policy.

Lastly, this study proposes that there should be a comparative study of forestry governance in the SADC region. This kind of study would help to learn how other forestry departments are performing and appreciate what institutions work and which

ones don't work and under what factors do they work. The argument is that there might be some similarities in the forest policies of SADC countries and Malawi. As such it can be easy for Malawi to mimic some of the ways and means how these countries effectively implement these policies.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Table 1 Showing Coding of Quoted Respondents

People involved in Timber business from Dedza      DN1, DSN8, DSN9, DSN6

People involved in Timber and Charcoal business from Zomba      ZC1, CCZ1, ZN3, ZN5,

Dedza District Council Officer      DDC1

Zomba District Council Officer      ZDC1

Zomba City Council Officer      ZCC1

Dedza Traditional Leader      DT1

Zomba Traditional leader      ZT1

Dedza Forest Officers      DF1,DF2

Zomba Forest Officers      ZF1, ZF2

## **Appendix 2: Informed consent**

My name is Rodwell Katundu, I am a Political Science Masters student from the University of Malawi, Chancellor College. I am researching the politics of policy implementation in the forest sector in Malawi. This study investigates how stakeholders interact within the environment characterised by both formal and informal rules.

Muli bwanji, dzina langa ndine Rodwell Katundu. Ndine wophunzira ku sukulu ya Ukachenjede ya ku Chancellor college ku Zomba yomwe ndi nthambi imodzi ya Univesite ya Malawi. Ndikupanga kafukufuku pa nkhani yokhudzana ndi mmene ntchito ya ndondomeko yetetezera nkhalango za m'dziko muno ikuyendera. Kafukufukuyu akukhazikika pa momwe onse amene akukhudziwa pa zakagwiritsidwe tchito nkhalango ku Malawi kuno amalumikizirana pogwira ntchito zawo, molingana ndi malamulo omwe amadziwika ndi otenganawo mbaliwa, omwe amawatsogolerera.

Your name has been chosen randomly/deliberately because of your involvement in the management/business of forest resources. Participation in this interview is voluntary. The information you are going to share with me in this interview will be confidential. This information will only be used for academic purposes, and will not include specific names of the people, their position of work and places where the interview took place their interview. In addition to this, there will be no way will identify that you gave this information.

Dzina lanu lasankhidwa chifukwa ndinu mmodzi mwa omwe amatenga nawo mbali pa ntchito zogwiritsa mitengo ya nkhalango za pa Malawi. Kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu ndi kosakakamiza koma kukutengela kudzipeleka kwanu. Zomwe tingakambirane pa kucheza kwathu zikhala komanso zidzakhala za chinsisi komanso



kusungidwa za chinsisi. Tipanga zotheke kuti tisatenge maina anu pa kucheza kwathu, komanso mu zolemba zonse za kafukufukuyu tidzayesetsa kuti musakapezekemo dzina lanu, komanso sipadzapezeka njira iliyonse yosonyeza kapena kudziwira kuti mwapeleka uthengawu ndi inuyo.

Your participation in this interview is very significant as it will help me to learn from you how stakeholders of the forest resources interact in an environment characterised by both formal and informal institutions, and how these interactions affect the conservation of forest resources.

Kutenga nawo mbali mu kafukufukuyu ndi kofunikira chifukwa uthenga omwe tingaphunzire kuchokera kwa inu udzathandiza kudziwa za momwe ntchito za omwe amatenga nawo pa ntchito za nkhalango ndi momwe amalumikizirana pogwira ntchito zawo kumakhudzira kasungidwe komanso katetezedwe ka nkhalango za pa Malawi pano.

I am not giving anything to you for participating in this interview, but if you agree to participate in this interview you are free to stop at any time of the interview if you want to stop. This interview would take about 40 minutes.

Sindikupeleka kalikonse wa munthu aliyense amene akutenga nawo mbali mukafukufukuyu. Koma muli ndi ufulu wotha kuyimitsa kachezedwe kathu nthawi ina iliyonse mukucheza kwathu. Kucheza kwathu kutenga pafupifupi mphindi makumi anayi.

Kodi muli omasuka kuti tikhoza kucheza.

I have freely agreed to participate in this study

Name.....

Signature.....

If there will be issues or questions relating to your rights or wish to report any violation of your rights, you may report these to the University of Malawi Research Ethics Committee (UNIMAREC), by calling or writing to them using the following contacts.

Ngati pangakhale madandaulo okhudzana ndi kuphwanyilidwa kwa ufulu wanu, muli ndi ufulu kudziwitsa Univesite ya Malawi ku Chancellor College pogwiritsa ntchito nambala ya foni ili pamusipayi komanso addressi, yomwe ili pamusi pa nambala ya foniyo

**Mobile number: (265) 01 524 222**

**Contact address: University of Malawi Research Ethics Committee (UNIMAREC), P.O. BOX. 280, Chancellor College, Zomba.**

### **Appendix 3: Interview guides**

#### **12.2 Key Informant Interview guide for Forest Officers**

##### ***12.2.1 The interest of forest officers in forest resources***

1. What is your position at this institution?

Kodi muli ndi udindo wanji pa ofesi pano?

2. In your view, why do you think the forest department is involved in the management of forest resources mainly trees?

Mukuganiza kwanu kodi ndi chifukwa chani offesi ya forestly imatenga nawo mbali poteteza nkhalango?

3. In your view, what are the benefits that you as forest officer/s get for being involved in this work?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti pali ubwino kapena phindu lanji lomwe mumapeza pogwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango?

4. In your view, what is the cost that you as forest officers incur for being involved in this work?

5. Kodi pali zopinga zANJI zomwe mumakumana nazo potenga nawo mbali pa ntchitoyi?

6. Are there incentives for you in your involvement in the management of the forestry resources?

Kodi pali china chilichonse chabwino chomwe chimakukopani ndi chani kuti mudzigwira ntchito imeneyi?

### ***12.2.2 Effects of these interests on forest resources***

1) In your view, how do the benefits of being involved obtained in working as forest officers affect the management of forest resources?

Kodi phindu lomwe mumapeza pogwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango imakhudza bwanji ntchito yoteteza nkhalango?

2) In your view, how does the cost of being involved obtained in working as forest officers affect the management of forest resources?

Nanga zopinga zomwe mumakumana nazo pogwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango imakhudza bwanji ntchito yanu yoteteza nkhalango?

### ***12.2.3. The effectiveness of forest institutions***

1. Do you have any knowledge about the laws governing the management of forests in this country?

Kodi mumadziwako malamulo okhudzana ndi kayendetsedwe ka nkhalango M'Malawi muno?

2. In your view do you believe that all stakeholders do abide by these laws?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti onse otenga nawo mbali pa kagwiritsidwe ntchito ka nkhalangoyi amatsatira malamulowa pogwiritsa ntchito nkhalango?

**(Probe on laws regarding harvesting/logging of trees, planting of trees, issuing of licences, bills gazetted by parliament and charcoal production)**

3. In your view do you believe that these rules are effective on their own, or there are other mechanisms that you employ to make sure that you achieve the same goals by the end of the day?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti malamulowa ndi amphamvu pawokha, kuti akhoza kugwira ntchito mwaokha, kapena pali njira zina zoonjezera zomwe mumagwiritsa ntchito pamwamba pa malamulowa?

4. What are these mechanisms?

Ngati mumagwiritsa ntchito njira zina ndi njira ziti zimenezi?

5. Does your position allow you to make decisions which are not provided in your laws?

Kodi udindo wanu umakupatsani mwayi wopanga zina mwa ziganizo zomwe mulibe mu malamulo anu?

6. Are favours given by you or your colleagues to the people whom they view as worth receiving these favours?

Kodi otenga nawo mbali ena amathandizidwa bwino mosiyana ndi anzawo kutengera kudziwana nawo, udindo wao kapena kuuzidwa ndi mabwana anu kuti muwathandize motero? **(Probe on what these favours are, and why these favours are offered, and if some favours are influenced by money)**

7. In your day to day work do you receive things like money as a way of saying thank you in terms of money or other non-monetary things

Kodi pa ntchito yanu, mumalandilako ndalama kwa anthu amene adula mitengo, kuotcha makala, komanso makampani amene adula mitengo, ngati njira imodzi yokuthokozerani?

8. Do things like superiority, politicians in line ministry, in government, traditional leaders, business people do influence in making in implementations of some of your decisions?

Kodi anthu ena a maudindo awo m'boma, kaya a ndale omwe chipani chawo chili m'boma, kaya ku Ministry, mafumu kapena anthu ena ochita ma bizinesi amalowererapo pogwira nthito yanu, kuti mupange ziganizo zokomera iwowo? **(Probe if these include the laws like of charcoal; production, tree logging prices).**

9. Do you think that those practices discussed above are perceived as a way of conducting business, and are deemed to be part of the business of the players involved like they are unwritten rules on how these players have to behave?

Kodi mchitidwe womwe takhala tkufotokozerana pamwambapa, umakhala woti onse omwe amatenga nawo mbali pogwiritsa ntchito nkhalango amautenga ngati momwe zimayenera kukhalira, ngati zithu zomwe amayenera kutsata?

10. with what we have discussed above, in your view do you believe these formal laws can exist on their own without these informal practices?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti malamulo a kayendetsedwe ka nkhalango, angathe kumagwira ntchito pa okha opanda zochitika zina zomwe zimachitika kunja kwa Malamulowa kuthandizira?

#### ***12.3.4. The effects of forest institutions on the forest resources***

1) In your view how has the effectiveness of the formal laws affected the management of the forest sector positively?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti kuchuluka mphamvu kwa malamulo okhudza kuteteza ndi kusamalira nkhalango kwathandiza bwanji ntchito zosamalira nkhalango?

2) In your view how has the ineffectiveness of the formal laws affected the management of the forest sector?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti kuchepa kwa mphamvu kwa malamulo okhudza kuteteza ndi kusamalira nkhalango kwathandiza bwanji ntchito zosamalira nkhalango?

3) In your view, how have these informal practices affected the management of the forest sector? **(Probe for both positive and negative effects).**

Kodi mukuganiza zinthu zina zomwe zimachitika kunja kwa lamulo zakhudza bwanji pa ntchito zoteteza nkhalango?

### **12.3.0.Key Informant *Interview* guide for Police Officers**

#### ***12.3.1. The interests of police officers in forest resources***

1. What position do you hold in the police department?

Kodi muli ndi udindo wANJI pa ntchito yanu

2. In your view, why do you think the police department is involved in the management of forest resources trees in particular?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti ndi chifukwa chani offesi ya apolisi imatenga nawo mbali poteteza nkhalango?

3. In your view, what are benefits that you as police officers get for being involved in this work?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti pali ubwino kapena phindu lanji lomwe mumapeza pogwira ntgwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango?

4. In your view, what are the cost incurred in this work as police officers?

Kodi pali zopinga zANJI zomwe mumakumana nazo potenga nawo mbli mukafukufukuyu?

5. Are there incentives for you in your involvement in the management of the forestry resources?

Kodi pali china chilichonse chabwino chomwe chimakukopani ndi kuti mudzigwira ntchito imeneyi?

### ***12.3.2. Effects of these interest on forest resources***

1. In your view, how do the benefits of being involved obtained in working as police officers affect the management of forest resources?

Kodi phindu lomwe mumapeza pogwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango imakhudza bwanji ntchito yoteteza nkhalango?

2. In your view, how do the cost of being involved in this work as Police officers affect the management of forest resources?

Nanga zopinga zomwe mumakumana nazo pogwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango imakhudza bwanji ntchito yanu yoteteza nkhalango?

### ***12.3.3. The effectiveness of forest institutions***

1. Do you have any knowledge about the laws governing the management of forests in this country?



Kodi mukudziwako malamulo ena aliwonse okhudzana ndi kayendetsedwe ka nkhalango m'Malawi muno? **(Probe on charcoal production and selling, logs transportation)**

2. Does your position allow you to make decisions that were not provided in your laws?

Kodi udindo wanu umatha kukupangitsani inuyo kapena anzanu, kupangaziganizio zomwe sizikuozezeka mmalamulo ogwira ntchito yanu?

3. Are favours given by you or your colleagues to the people whom you view as worth receiving these favours about those transporting forest resources without proper papers?

Kodi zimatheka inuyo kapena anzanu kukondera anthu ena omwe mumaona kuti ndi oyenera kutero, omwe amatenga mitengo kaya Makala opanda zikalata zowayenereza kutero? (Probe if they receive something in return like money, or even forests resources)

4. Do things like superiority, politicians in line ministry, in government, traditional leaders, business people do influence in making in implementations of some of your decisions?

Kodi anthu a maudindo ku ntchito kwanu, kaya m'boma, mafumu kaya a business, amalowererapo pa ntchito yanu?

5. What happens to people that are caught are transporting charcoal or logs illegally?

Kodi chimachitika ndi chani kwa anthu amene agwidwa atanyamula makala kapena nkhuhi pa galimoto mozembera mostsata malamulo?

6. Do you or your colleagues sometimes ask them to pay you money to allow them to go?

Kodi nthawi zina mumwafunsa kuti akupatseni ndalama kuti muwalole kuti adutse?

7. Do you think that these practices are expected by all players involved like they are unwritten rules on how these players have to behave?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti mchitidwe omwe takambiranawo, ndi woti onse otenga nawo mbali anawuzolowera ndipo samaona chachilendo?

8. In your view what do you think keeps these practices going?

Kodimukuganiza kuti ndi chani chomwe chimapangitsa kuti mchitidwe uwuwu udzipitilira?

9. With what we have discussed above, in your view do you believe these formal laws can exist on their own without these informal practices?

Pa zomwe takambiranazo kodi mukukhulupirira kuti malamulo aokhudzana ndi kusamala komanso kagwiritsidwe ntchito ka nkhalango, ndi amphamvu pawokha, kapena amafunikira kumagwiritsidwa ntchito mogwirizana ndi zinthunzina zomwe sizinalmbedwe mmalamulo?

#### ***12.3.4. The effects of forest institutions on the forest resources***

1) In your view how has the effectiveness of the formal laws affected the management of the forest sector positively?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti kuchuluka mphamvu kwa malamulo okhudza kuteteza ndi kusamalira nkhalango kwathandiza bwanji ntchito zosamalira nkhalango?

2) In your view how has the ineffectiveness of the formal laws affected the management of the forest sector?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti kuchepa kwa mphamvu kwa malamulo okhudza kuteteza ndi kusamalira nkhalango kwathandiza bwanji ntchito zosamalira nkhalango?

3) In your view, how has these informal practices affected the management of the forest sector?

Kodi mukuganiza zinthu zina zomwe zimachitika kunja kwa lamulo zakhudza bwanji pa ntchito zoteteza nkhalango?

#### ***12.4. Interview guide for people involved in timber and charcoal business***

##### ***12.4.1 the interests of people involved in the timber and charcoal business***

1. How is your business progressing?

Kodi bizinesi yanu ikuyenda bwanji?

2. Apart from this kind of business what other kinds of businesses or other activities which you are involved in?

Kupatula business yomwe mukupangayi, kodi ndi ntchito zina kapena ma business ena ati omwe mumapanga?

3. Why did you decide to be involved in this business, when there are other businesses which you could get yourselves involved?

Kodi ndi chifukwa chiyani munasankha business ya nkhuni/mitengo kapena makala?

4. What benefits do you get from this business?

Kodi mumapeza phindu lotani popanga business imeneyi?

5. Do you believe this is one of the best businesses you got yourselves involved in?

Kodi mukukhulupirira kuti pa ma business onse amene mumachita business iyi ndi imodzi mwa ma business abwion omwe mumapanga?

6. What challenges do you face during the course of your business?

#### ***12.4.2. effects of these Interests on forest resources***

1. What determines your production level?

Kodi ofuna Makala/mitengo kapena malonda nu okhudza ndi zopangidwa kuchokera ku mitengo akachuluka kodi zimakhudza bwanji kuotcha komanso kudula mitengo?

2. What happens when trees are getting depleted in a forest?

Kodi chimachitika ndi chani madera omwe mumapezako mitengo kapena kuotcha Makala akachepa?

3. In your view, in what ways would you say that your business has affected the conservation of forest in this area?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti business yanuyi yakhudza bwanji kasamalidwe ka mitengo ya mnkhalango, (mwaubwino komanso moipa)?

### ***12.4.3. The effectiveness of forest institutions***

How is the management of forest resources done in this area?

Kodi nthito yoyang'anira nkhalango imayend abwanji kudera lino?

1. Do you know any rules or laws concerning your business in forest resources like trees?

Kodi mukudziwako za malamulo okhudzana ndi kachitidwe ka businezi yanu yokhudzana ndi mitengo?

1. In your view are these rules or laws efficiently and effectively implemented?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti malamulo amenewa amagwira nthito moyenerera?

2. As you are doing your business, which actors do you interact with or come across?

Kodi pochita business yanu mumakumana komanso kulumikizana ndi otenga nawo mbali ati?

3. Does your position or the kind of money you make, allow you to receive favours to do transactions easier and faster than those with less money you to make decisions which were not provided in your laws?

Kodi udindo wanu kapena ndalama zomwe mumapeza zimakuthandizani kuti muthandizidwe msanga, kapena kuti kukondeledwa mukalakwira lamulo lina, kusiyana ndi anzanu omwe ali ndi ndalama zochepa?

4. Do these favours also include being asked to pay less than the required amount of money if found that you have violated the law (eg carrying charcoal without a licence, charcoal burning, being found in transportations of trees without permits)

Kodi kukondeledwa kumeneku kukhudazana ndi kupeleka ndalama zochepa mukapezeka olakwa pa nkhani zokhudza kugwiritsa ntchito mitengo?

5. In your view do you believe that these favours are extended to actors like politicians, traditional leaders, and other people holding high positions in the civil service?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti ena mwa otenga nawo mbali amakondeledwa monga andale, anthu otchuka, mafumu kapena akuluakulu ogwira ntchito m'boma?

6. Do you or your colleagues do give any money or other resources to speed up or allow other stakeholders to conduct their business in the forests?

Kodi inuyo kapena anzanu amapeleka ndalama kuti muthandizidwe mwansanga mukamafuna kupnga business yanu yokhudzana ndi mitengo?

7. In your view, do things like superiority, politicians in line ministry, in government, traditional leaders, business people do influence forest officers or police officers in making in implementations of some of your decisions?

Kodi ukuganiza kuti a business, mafumu, a ndale, kapena anthu ena ogwira ntchito m'boma amalowerera pa kagwilidwe ntchito ka a forestry kapena apolisi pa nkhani yokhudzana ndi nkhalango?

8. In your view, do you think that these practices are expected and consented by all players involved, like they are unwritten rules on how these players have to behave?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti mchitidwe ndi woti onse otenga nawo mbali anawuzolowera kuti ndi momwe zimayenera kukhalira?

***12.4.4.4 The effects of forests institutions on the conservation of forest resources***

1) In your view how have the formal laws affected the management of the forest sector?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti kuchuluka mphamvu kwa malamulo okhudza kuteteza ndi kusamalira nkhalango kwathandiza bwanji ntchito zosamalira nkhalango?

2) In your view, how has the informal practices affected the management of the forest sector?

Kodi mukuganiza zinthu zina zomwe zimachitika kunja kwa lamulo zakhudza bwanji pa ntchito zoteteza nkhalango?

## **12.5.0. Key Informant Interview guide for traditional leaders**

### ***12.5.1. The Interests of the traditional leaders in forest resources***

1. Do you hold any position with respect to the management of resources in this area?

Kodi muli ndi udindo wanji pa nkhani yokhudzana ndi kusamalira nkhalango?

2. In your view, what is your role in the management of forest resources mainly trees?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti muli ndi udindo wanji pa nkhani yoteteza mitengo?

3. In your view do you believe you do play an important role in the management of forests?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti udindo wanu ndi wofunika poteteza mitengo?

4. What are the benefits that you as a Traditional leader get for being involved in this work?

Kodi mumapeza phindu lanji pogwira ntchito yoteteza mitengo?

5. In your view, what are the cost that you as a Traditional leader get for being involved in this work?

Kodi pali zopinga zANJI zomwe mumakumana nazo pogwira ntchito yoteteza mitengo?



6. Are there incentives for you in your involvement in the management of the forestry resource?

Kodi pali zokukukopani zilizonse pogwira ntchito imeneyi?

***12.5.2. The effects of these Interest on forest resources***

1. In your view, how do the benefits of being involved obtained in working as police officers affect the management of forest resources?

2.

Kodi phindu lomwe mumapeza pogwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango imakhudza bwanji ntchito yoteteza nkhalango?

3. In your view, how do the cost of being involved in this work as Police officers affect the management of forest resources?

Nanga zopinga zomwe mumakumana nazo pogwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango imakhudza bwanji ntchito yanu yoteteza nkhalango.

***12.5.3. The effectiveness of forest institutions***

1. Do you know any laws concerning the governance and the management of forests in this country?

Kodi mukudziwako malamulo ena aliwonse okhudzana ndi kagwiritsidwe komanso kasamalidwe ka mitengo ya mnkhalango?

2. In your view, do you think these laws are efficiently and effectively implemented?

Kodi malamulo amenewa amagwira ntchito moyenerera

3. Do you as a traditional leader influence some decisions with respect to forest decisions like planting trees, who should have access to the harvesting of trees?

Kodi mumatha kupanga nawo ziganizo zokhudzana ndi kuasamalidwe komanso kagwiritsidwe ntchito ka nkhalango?

4. Do other people like politicians do influence you in your decisions of harvesting permits, planting of trees?

Kodi anthu monga a ndale, amthu ena a m'boma amalowerera nawo pa ntchito yanu yoteteza ndi kusamalira mitengo?

5. Are favours given by you or your colleagues to the people whom they view as worth receiving these favours?

Kodi anthu ena kapena ena otenga nawo mbali amakondeledwa mwapaderadera pa nkhani yokhudza mitengo?

6. In your view, why do you believe that these favours are given, or why do you provide these favours?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti ndi chifukwa chani ena amakondeledwa?

7. In your day to day work do you receive things like money as a way of saying thank you in terms of money or other things?

Kodi mumalandira ndalama ngati njira imodzi yokuthokozerani?

8. Do you or your colleagues receive or asked to receive any money to speed up or allow other stakeholders to conduct their business in the forests?

Nanga nthawi zina ena amapeleka ndalama kuti muwathandize mwamsanga?

9. In your view Do things like superiority, politicians in line ministry, in government, traditional leaders, business people do influence in making in implementations of some of your decisions?

Kodi anthu ena a ndale, a amaudindi mu m'boma, mafumu anzanu amalowererapo mukamapanga ziganizo zina zokhudzana ndi kusamala komanso ka gwiritsidwe ntchito ka nkhalango?

10. With what we have discussed above do you believe that these formal laws can exist on their own without these informal practices?

Pa zomwe takambirana pamwambazi kodi mukuganiza kuti malamulo a kasamalidwe komanso kayendetsedwe ka nkhalango ndi amphamvu kuteteza nkhalango pa okha kapena pamafunikira njira zina zothandizira kuteteza nkhalango?

#### ***12.5.4. The effects of the forest institutions on the forest resources***

1) In your view how has the effectiveness of the formal laws affected the management of the forest sector positively?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti kuchuluka mphamvu kwa malamulo okhudza kuteteza ndi kusamalira nkhalango kwathandiza bwanji ntchito zosamalira nkhalango?

2) In your view how has the ineffectiveness of the formal laws affected the management of the forest sector?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti kuchepa kwa mphamvu kwa malamulo okhudza kuteteza ndi kusamalira nkhalango kwathandiza bwanji ntchito zosamalira nkhalango?

3) In your view, how have these informal practices affected the management of the forest sector?

Kodi mukuganiza zinthu zina zomwe zimachitika kunja kwa lamulo zakhudza bwanji pa ntchito zoteteza nkhalango?

## **12.6. Key Informant Interview guide for local council officers.**

- i. The interest of local council officers in forest resources

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1. In your council do you have a department that is responsible for public forest?

Kodi pa khonsolo pano muli ndi department yomwe imayanga'nira za nkhalango?

2. In your view, why do you think the council is involved in the management of forest resources mainly trees?

Kodi mukuganiza ndi chifukwa chani khonsolo yanu imatenga nawo mbali pa nkhani yoteteza ndi kusamala nkhalango?

3. In your view, what are the direct benefits that you as council get for being involved in this work?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti Khonsolo lanu lmapindula bwanji potenga nawo mbali pa nkhani youkHUDZA kusamalira nkhalango?

4. In your view, what are the costs that you as council get for being involved in this work?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti khonsolo yanu imakumana ndi zopinga zANJI potenga nawo mbali pa nkhani yosamalira nkhalango?

5. In your view, the council benefits from collecting market fee from those selling forest resources products such as logs, firewood and charcoal?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti khonsolo lanu limapindula potolera ndalama za ma tikiti a nthi ogulitsa Makala, nkhuni komanso mitengo?

ii. Effects of these Interest on forest resources.

1. In your view, how do the benefits of being involved obtained in working as police officers affect the management of forest resources?

Kodi phindu lomwe mumapeza pogwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango imakhudza bwanji ntchito yoteteza nkhalango?

2. In your view, how do the cost of being involved in this work as council officers affect the management of forest resources?

Nanga zopinga zomwe mumakumana nazo pogwira ntchito yoteteza nkhalango imakhudza bwanji ntchito yanu yoteteza nkhalango?

iii The effectiveness of forest institutions.

1. Do you know any laws concerning the governance and the management of forests in this country?

Kodi mukudziwako malamulo ena aliwonse okhudzana ndi kayendetsedwe komanso kagwiritsidwe ntchito ka nkhalango MMalawi muno?

2. What about the laws concerning who to allow to sell charcoal and forest wood in your market?

Nanga mumadziwako chani chokhudzana ndi malamulo okhudzana ndi kugulitsa mitengo komanso Makala?

3. Why do you still charge some fee on those selling charcoal without some licences?

Kodi ndi chifukwa chani mumadulabe ma tikiti kwa anthu ogulitsa makala komanso mitengo opanda zikalata za chilolezo?

4. In your view do things like superiority, politicians in line ministry, in government, traditional leaders, business people do influence in making in implementations of some of your decisions, concerning the charging of fees on forest resources?

Kodi anthu ena otenga nawo mbali pa nkhani ya kagwiritsidwe ntchito komanso katetezedwe ka nkhalango amalowererapo pa ziganizo zanu zokhudza nkhani za Makala koamnso mitengo?

5. Do you or some of your colleagues receive money, or use your position to favour other business people to sell freely their forest products like charcoal in your markets?

Kodi inuyo kapena anzanu ogwira nawo ntchito, mumapeleka ziphaso mwaulegere kwa anthu ena a bizinesi kuti agulitse kapena Makala mu mzinda wanun uno.

#### IV. The effects of forest institutions on the conservation of the forest resources

1) In your view how has the effectiveness of the formal laws affected the management of the forest sector positively?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti kuchuluka mphamvu kwa malamulo okhudza kuteteza ndi kusamalira nkhalango kwathandiza bwanji ntchito zosamalira nkhalango?

2) In your view how has the ineffectiveness of the formal laws affected the management of the forest sector?

Kodi mukuganiza kuti kuchepa kwa mphamvu kwa malamulo okhudza kuteteza ndi kusamalira nkhalango kwathandiza bwanji ntchito zosamalira nkhalango?

3) In your view, how have these informal practices affected the management of the forest sector?

Kodi mukuganiza zinthu zina zomwe zimachitika kunja kwa lamulo zakhudza bwanji pa ntchito zoteteza nkhalango?